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Chapter One: When Helping Hurts
I genuinely believe that we live in a world today where people want to do “good.”
Millennials specifically have been documented as caring more about issues of
sustainability and fair trade when it comes to consumer habits. We are more likely to
spend more money on “green” products, fair trade certified goods, and supporting local
businesses. For all intents and purposes, it has become popular to be ethical (Rotabi et al.,
2017). Millennials will even devote more of their free time and energy to making the
world a better place as indicated in the spikes of young people choosing to volunteer with
the less fortunate at home and on service trips abroad (Wuthnow, 1991). Thanks to the
rise of social media, these same young people then have an unprecedented amount of
information they can use to research products, services, and volunteer opportunities. They
can also share their adventures in volunteering on their social media accounts to create
awareness among their peers and continue outreach to communities from around the
world. One could argue, it has never been easier nor more popular to volunteer.
At Regis, the focus on social justice is especially emphasized. The Jesuit credence
“men and women for and with others” permeates every class I have taken, every project I
had the privilege of undertaking with the Center for Service Learning and the Institute on
the Common Good, and it has been a standard I strive to uphold. Throughout my four
years at Regis I have been taught theoretical frameworks for ethically engaging in the
world, the necessity for examining roles of power and privilege, and that structures of
injustice exist. This new understanding led to personal epiphanies on how cycles of
oppression are created and perpetuated through complicity in unjust structures. Through
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learning various ethical theoretical lenses in which to view the world, it became apparent
to me these structures not only existed but that I helped those structures stay in power
through my silence all while passively benefitting from them. Once learning this reality, I
could no longer claim to care about ethics while actively allowing others to be harmed.
I knew theoretically why I should care but I wasn’t sure how to actively pursue an
ethic of care for the other in the real world. This thesis is an attempt to reconcile the
tension that naturally arises when theory transitions into praxis. I have studied theories of
ethical service, development policy, and non-profit work over my college career yet I still
find myself grappling on how to proceed; how can I personally be someone that
dismantles systems of oppression instead of contributing to them?
Myself, and countless others in my generation, grapple with the struggle of good
intentions and not knowing how to enact the change we want to see in the world. Take for
example, individuals who purchase TOMS shoes because they genuinely want to help
improve the lives of children living in poverty across the globe. These consumers have
the best intentions of helping others but fail to realize that the TOMS distribution network
can do more damage to community than good. Namely because when TOMS give a pair
of free shoes to everyone in an impoverished community, they inadvertently flood the
supply side of the market for shoes which ultimately leads to creating new dependencies
on Western aid. TOMS Shoes unintentionally cripples local economies by driving shoe
vendors and local repairmen out of business by oversaturating the local commodity
concerning this single commodity. Then when these cheaply made shoes inevitably begin
to fall apart, there is no one to buy new shoes from or go to for repairs as the cobblers and
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shoe vendors were unable to keep their businesses afloat. These communities then rely on
TOMS for another donation, and so on and so forth. This is one example upon countless
others of individuals who have the best of intentions to help those in need but their
actions end up hurting these communities more than helping.
I, like many other individuals my age, have a plethora of experience in
volunteering. Volunteering (much like the TOMS example) is another field where
helping can actually hurt. However, in the case of volunteering the stakes are much
higher since it involves direct engagement between communities delivering and receiving
invaluable resources. I became interested in this research through my own experiences
with volunteering in which I stumbled upon one of the largest and least critically
examined fields where good intentions and problematic practices intersect: Faith-based
organizations (FBOs) in international aid and development. Specifically, my introduction
to the world of volunteer service was through the inculcation of faith-based
organizations. My first international trip was a mission trip with Easthaven Baptist
Church. We went to Ensenada, Mexico to build a house for a family of four with Habit
for Humanity and in partnership with the FBO Youth with a Mission (YWAM). While
there, we hosted Vacation Bible Schools in poverty strapped neighborhoods, conducted
tokenizing gestures of false generosity by handing out cheap toys to children in the
barrios, and became undeniable voyeuristic “voluntourists” as we went to the red-light
district handing out Gideon Bibles. Those in my group, myself included, applauded
ourselves for “helping” and delivering the Gospel to “those that needed it most.”

3

Retrospectively, what I am most ashamed of is how we silenced the community
we were attempting to “empower” through sharing about Jesus. We were fifteen kids
from Montana relying on two translators more concerned with the number of souls saved
then the individuals we worked with. While the children, women, and men we engaged
with were always gracious, we did not properly return the favor since we seldom gave
them the opportunity to speak for themselves. We didn’t learn their stories, ask their
opinions, or bother to understand them because we didn’t take the time to ask. Instead we
created narratives about them, exploiting their silence, in order to fit our assumptions and
beliefs.
Sadly, this was not a one-off experience of my own naiveté leading me to work in
problematic ways through FBOs. During the summers, I worked at a church camp as a
counselor for young girls, ages 8-12, on the east side of Glacier National Park. The camp
catered to children from the Blackfeet tribe living on the reservation in Browning. Like
many reservations across the United States, Browning was riddled with drug and alcohol
abuse and plagued with high suicide rates as well as domestic violence as a result of
generations of cyclical poverty with little chance of social mobility. The camp I
volunteered at would offer week long, overnight camp and was free to anyone willing to
participate. As a result, tired grandparents would drop off their grandchildren for a week
of respite. I remember one beautiful six-year old girl, she and her grandmother had lied
about her birth date in order to meet the minimum enrollment age so she could participate
in camp that summer. As a counselor, I taught children about hiking, swimming, local
flora and fauna, and sat next to my girls after lunch as the director preached about the
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truth of God and creationism. Every night I sat huddled around the dining hall tables with
my girls while the camp director professed creationist ideology and countered evolution
as an insidious myth (crafted by the scientific community no less). Initially, I believed in
these sermons but as my views changed I felt physically ill that young, impressionable
children were being subjected to this indoctrination while at innocent summer camp.
At the end of the summer some of the children would become Christians and get
baptized in the creek. Understand, the Christians they became mimicked the form of
Christianity they were introduced to and conditioned to understand at camp. This meant
that if children decided to convert to Christianity at this church camp, they were
inadvertently converting to a specific sub-sect of Christian ideology. This sub-section, or
denomination, would hold different ideological beliefs on certain aspects of Christianity.
For instance, where Catholics may believe in baptism for infants, the Baptists at this
camp believed in the truth of full immersion baptism. Expanding beyond religious
practices like baptism, this also translated into differing views on evolution, family
values, and gender roles. In this instance, the form of Christianity these children adopted
were the same as the camp directors, who happened to be creationist evangelicals.
This camp is an excellent example of an FBO that offered wonderful services: the
opportunity to learn about nature and play in the outdoors, it fed and kept these children
safe, and while these children were there they were continually told how loved they were.
This FBO provided no financial barrier of entry in order to reach out to this vulnerable
community, and as a result individuals relied on this service. Children learned to parrot
Bible verses in order to get t-shirts and answer Biblical trivia to gain spots in line for
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food, all individuals sang worship songs, and students would review creationist teaching
throughout the day. Those at this church camp called their ministry to Native American
children “outreach”, I call it coercive proselytism. Because when you can’t afford to send
your children to summer camp, parents and grandparents feel pressure to send their
children to free camps. Sure, some of them may have known the implicit cost would be
exposing their children to fundamentalist right-wing ideology, but I wonder if these
guardians understood the pressure these children felt to parrot back that ideology in order
to get token gifts like t-shirts or to fall in the good graces of the camp leadership. I cannot
even begin to convey how deeply I regret my participation in this and even now I struggle
confessing my involvement in proselytizing to children.
Seeing firsthand the harms that various religious based non-profits (or FBOs)
unintentionally inflict on the communities they aim to help is what drove me to research
this work. I didn’t just want to regret my role in it, I wanted to explore the root cause of
good intentions turning into coercion. I wanted to understand how I had contributed to
the cyclical oppression that the Blackfeet tribe had experienced so that I would never do
something so despicable again and I could explain, in an articulate way, to others to warn
them not to partake in this work.
In some ways, I am writing this thesis as an atonement of my sins, for
participating in proselytism, but beyond my own transgressions I am most interested in
writing this as a warning for others who have the best of intentions and don’t realize that
their “helping” can do unquantifiable harms. More importantly, this thesis is written out
of a place of necessity. I believe that affluent groups in the West are coming to terms with
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the immense amount of power and privilege they hold and want to give back in some
ways. They are willing and able to devote time, money, and energy towards causes they
believe in. Now all they need is critical direction. This thesis is an exploration for how
praxis and theory can go terribly wrong without critical reflection and will begin to
explore how to answer some of the most pressing questions of our time: what do you do
when helping hurts?
This thesis will explore how ideographs are able to take root in development
literature and the development field writ large. I will examine the theoretical construct of
ideographs and look at ideographs in components in order to analyze their three
functions. Though I describe ideographs in more detail in my methods section, I will flag
that I am looking to discover their discernable functions through my analysis.
Ideographs are often undetected language terms in common discourse yet hold
significant weight insofar as they form collective responses that lead individuals into
group thought and action. Specifically, by dissecting them and breaking them into their
parts I can discern 1) specific impacts ideographs have had on individual identities, 2)
how the language we use can influence larger communities, and 3) how ideographs form
political identity and community action. The first chapter of analysis looks exclusively at
how “development” as a term is an ideograph and the implications of FBOs choosing to
coopt it. The second chapter explores the rise of the Religious Right through political
narrative constructive. The second half of the chapter explores introduction of American
FBOs onto the international stage by analyzing the ideograph of stewardship as it plays
out in secular and faith-based communities for fundraising. Finally, I end my argument
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with the case study of “family values” in Uganda in order to show that FBOs are using
ideographs and constitutive rhetoric when they engage in development practices.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
In the world of international development, billions of individuals are connected to
one another through a complex network of aid which transfers resources and ideas on a
daily basis in order to provide support to vulnerable populations. There is no denying that
aid, and specifically foreign aid, has fundamentally changed a record number of lives in
this time of globalization as human interaction and connection unceasingly span across
all corners of the globe.
Yet questions remain in regards to the ethicality and efficacy of these
organizations devoted to international aid and development in how they deliver resources
and connect with people. These questions have sparked what scholars refer to as the
“Great Aid Debate” (Lynch and Schwarz, 2016, p. 60). “The Great Aid Debate”
acknowledges the growing field of development, the realities communities face when
experiencing poverty or recovering from natural disasters, as well as recognizing that
funding and personnel available to satiate the needs of these communities are limited.
Individuals, governments, and groups want to invest their time and money into ethical
and efficient structures to aid in development and the alleviation of poverty. The question
then becomes how we identify ethical and efficient structures in which to invest in order
to best serve those receiving aid.
In order to understand where we should invest and our own stake in the “Great
Aid Debate,” first recognize the organizations that provide the backbone to international
development on a systemic level by examining the structures that exist within these
organizations who handle transferring resources. Specifically, this literature review will
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examine the newest and fasting growing of the three predominant actors that provide aid
to vulnerable populations on domestic and international fronts.

Definitions and Actors
In international aid and development, there are three predominant players who
circulate aid: national governments (also referred to as state actors), secular nongovernmental agencies (NGOs), and faith-based organizations (FBOs). This paper will
focus exclusively on FBOs as their role in international aid has grown significantly over
the last decade, yet relatively little is known about them or their efficacy in serving
vulnerable populations (Clarke, and Ware, 2015; Roberts-DeGennaro and Fogel, 2007). It
is important to recognize that all three actors utilize different structures to collect and
disperse aid in order to support billions of individuals across the world. Through
recognizing the scope FBOs in particular have taken on to interact with communities, a
rising imperative in development literature has begun to surface which calls for
identifying and supporting actors which best solve for development to the populations
they interact with.
Analyzing faith-based organizations has proven difficult due to the nebulous
definition of FBO existing in the status quo. Without clear boundaries on what “faithbased” entails or how it plays out in an organization’s structure, a lack of clarity means
many organizations do not self-identify or get classified by governments as FBOs.
Specifically, an FBO is defined as any non-governmental organization “that derives
inspiration and guidance for its activities from the teachings and principles of the faith or
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from a particular interpretation or school of thought with a faith” (Clarke & Jennings,
2008; Hefferan, Adkins & Occhipian, 2009, p. 7). Meaning FBOs may manifest in a
gambit of ways spanning from long- and short-term mission work, churches, faith
networks reaching across the globe, or NGOs that exist because the founder and
volunteers follow “inspiration and guidance” from their faith without imposing it on the
populations they serve (Hefferan, Adkins and Occhipian, 2009, p. 12). Due to the lack of
discussion around FBO aid writ large, these groups across the spectrum often do not
either understand the importance of identifying as an FBO or believe they do not qualify
as an FBO at all.
Faith is then integrated into these various organizations’ formats through vastly
different means and to varying degrees. For some FBOs, conversion is the ultimate goal
for the populations they serve and functionally why they exist, for others teachings from
holy texts are used as models for aid and education, and some FBOs may appear as
secular organizations but the reason for their existence and ability to continue is due to
the motivations of personal faith by those who work within the organization (Clarke and
Ware, 2015; Hefferan, Adkins and Occhipian, 2009, p. 10, “Table 1.1 FBO Typology”).
Faith-based organizations have a unique way of dispersing aid as compared to their
secular counterparts. In addition to being able to integrate into local communities through
church networks, the ideology that FBOs hold are central to their identities in comparison
to state sponsored aid or secular non-government organizations (NGOs). Due to their
belief-based conception which is why it is important for FBOs to either identify
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themselves or be classified by the government as faith-based instead of secular nongovernmental organizations.
Despite the differences in FBOs faith-influenced structures, FBOs across the
board internalize, reference or rely on three key themes as essential components in their
day to day operations. These center pillars which define how faith is integrated into the
organizations’ operating structure and outcomes are proselytism, evangelizing, and
witnessing (Doron and Foster, 2016). Proselytism typically refers to “end-directed efforts
to spread faith through conversion” (Fletcher, 2014, p. 67; Stanhke, 1991, pp. 255-6) or
more critically, “defined as actively promoting conversion to a particular ideology or
religion or otherwise pressuring potential converts to accord with specific norms and
practices” (Lynch and Schwartz, 2016, p. 60). While proselytism is typically frowned
upon by FBOs and the international community (Fletcher, 2014, p. 68) the lack of
binding legal definition means that proselytism conduct is still hotly debated among FBO
members and participants. In this same vein, witnessing and evangelizing are also defined
through subjective means depending on the individual or individual organization being
interviewed. The lack of clear legal definitions around these buzzwords have resulted in a
stigma around the word “proselytism” while using phrases like evangelizing and
witnessing as a de facto form of proselytism on a massive scale (Fletcher, 2014, p. 68).
For those outside of the evangelical communities it can be immensely difficult to
articulate why “evangelizing” is considered better than “proselytizing.” While I will
describe these terms in length later, the simplest way to describe this distinction is that
there isn’t one: meaning that these terms effectively describe the same practices.
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However, it is more palatable for the faith community to go out and “witness” or
“evangelize” as those direct words have been conditioned as part of the call to action of
these communities and as a central pillar of their faith. Even those within the FBO
community recognize that “proselytism” is wrong without recognizing that they have
succeeded in rebranding proselyting practices under these new terms.

Critiques on Proselytism
The vast array of disapproval toward proselytism stems from the perception of
proselytism’s tendency to tie aid to religious conversion as a form of coercion. The
perceived coercive nature of tying aid to pressure or incentivize changing “the ideologies
or religious beliefs . . . of another” (Fletcher, 2014, p. 69) illicit rejection from the
majority of FBOs and global agents alike. Specifically, large supra-national governmental
groups like the United Nations oppose proselytism because they believe it is offering
“conditional aid” and creating the opportunity for exploitation among the world’s most
vulnerable populations like those living in extreme poverty in the Global South or those
in need of assistance after natural disasters in developing countries (James, 2011).
Essentially, critics of FBOs worry that by tying aid and ideology together when
individuals are in dire need of assistance, means that a person is more susceptible to meet
norms or go through the motions of a religious practice in order to satiate a basic need
like hunger, thirst, shelter or to receive services like education or healthcare.
Proselytism is viewed as coercive by many because the fine line between
incentivizing behavior to start conversations on faith and the perception of “holding aid
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hostage” is an incredibly hard tension to navigate despite proper non-coercive intentions
by FBOs. Larribeau and Broadhead (2014) highlight one clear example of how a group
with the best intentions fell down the slippery-slope of proselytism when their Bangkok
based church began outreach to refugees in Southeast Asia. It was apparent that NGOs
and state actors could not provide aid to meet the needs of the swell of refugees entering
into Thailand’s booming urban hub. FBOs like the aforementioned church were willing
to step in to help provide food, shelter and various other resources. However, the
church’s ability to provide aid and services to those immigrants slipping between the
cracks was short-lived. Soon the church found it didn’t have the resources to sustain itself
and answer the needs of the refugee community it aimed to help. Even typical services
the church offered like its weekly fellowship dinner was coopted when an influx of
refugees who desperately needed food began attending and were willing to pray or recite
scripture in order to receive sustenance. The congregation found that their best intentions
were creating unnecessary pressure for refugees to take on their faith, ideals and practices
while refugees felt that they were manipulating their faith in order to receive food and
other resources. Ultimately, the congregation joined BASRAN, Bangkok Asylum Seekers
and Refugee Assistance Network (BASRAN) with other members consisting of FBOs,
NGOs, and refugee leaders. The conclusion this FBO reached was that they needed to
reach out to coordinate with groups better equipped to aid refugees and to curb potential
coercion unintentionally caused by church’s good faith efforts. The necessity of relying
on networks of aid outside of FBOs alone is a growing trend for FBOs who lack
resources to provide social services for target groups they work with (Ager, 2014). As
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evidenced by this case study, proselytism is not typically purposeful but when delivering
assistance to vulnerable populations the propensity to proselytize and exploit
communities falls on a slippery slope.
Despite the consensus on the harms of proselytism, no universal standards exist
banning the practice. Individual countries like India have explicitly banned FBOs from
proselytism but the critical need for aid and lack of binding legal definitions means that
even these structures can be exploited again due to muddled lines between witnessing,
evangelizing, and proselytism (Lynch and Schwartz, 2016) which deepens the divide and
distrust of FBOs and their propensity to proselytize. International groups like the
UNHCR published a Dialogue on Faith in 2012 which attempts to create an international
standard as previous attempts like the Code of Conduct did before (Ager, 2014, p. 18).
The problem with both the UNHCR Dialogue on Faith and the Code of Conduct before it
are twofold: first, there is no binding mechanism to either individual FBOs or countries
that are willing to enforce these standards as a universal norm. Secondly, few groups
classify themselves as FBOs, even less realize that these guidelines apply to them.
Without an enforcement mechanism and awareness of standards, these guidelines do little
if anything to enforce ethical rules of engagement. Currently, the treatment of FBOs and
proselytism is a patchwork quilt of standards and allows for the system to be exploited
through nebulous definitions and an opt-in mentality for engaging with vulnerable
communities.
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Presence of FBOs
FBOs have spiked in popularity in the last two decades despite being around for
thousands of years. Some analysts believe that FBOs acted as the first providers of social
services (James, 2011). Throughout many religions, spanning from Christianity to
Buddhism, a call to care for the poor and to care for the world around them act as
transcendental themes in holy texts and dogma mobilizing millions. Due to this call,
FBOs of all religions (Christians, Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, etc.) have been doing
pertinent work around the globe since the inception of their religions (Kissane, 2007).
Organizations like churches or individuals who personally feel compelled to answer this
call have given resources and their time to helping marginalized communities for
thousands of years, notably before the field of development began.
Today, in the world of globalization, FBOs are reaching record number of people
and their scope has expanded to cover nearly the entire globe. Looking at the
“volontourism” industry alone we have seen significant growth. According to a study
done by Tourism Research and Marketing conducted in 2008, “up to 1.6 million people
worldwide participate in volunteer tourism, spending between 832 million euros and 1.3
billion euros annually” (Luh Sin, Oakes, and Mostafanezhead, 2015, p. 119). Due to the
expanded scope of FBOs and globalization, individuals who are interested in serving
underserved populations can find it easier to engage with these groups through
volontourism. Volontourism not only attracts millions, but the free volunteer support and
impromptu leadership in offering social services like education, donating resources,
healthcare, etc. mean that administrative costs are defrayed keeping FBOs cheaper than
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their secular and state run counterparts (Roberts-Degennaro and Fogel, 2007, p. 49;
McGehee, 2014, p. 848). Interacting with millions, collecting billions, and reaching
countless across the globe FBOs have grown as globalization aids in making the world
smaller and more accessible to travel, disseminate information, and forges connections
through technological advancements.

Rise of FBOs in the US
The nature of government relations and FBOs in the US are rapidly changing.
Over the last decade, funding has significantly expanded from governments like the
United States to support faith-based initiatives in providing social services. RobertsDeGennaro and Fogel argue that this is both beneficial as FBOs have a long history of
serving communities in need and potentially detrimental as it erodes the line between
separation of church and state (2007). They conclude with a call to action that the US
federal government must define FBOs, outline appropriate FBO activity and outcomes,
and create a place to access this data as no system is currently in place.
The trend of normalizing FBOs as social service providers came in 2004 when the
White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiative was created under
President George W. Bush which allowed for billions in money to be granted out to
NGOs and FBOs. The office expanded to reach eight different central departments in the
United States Federal Government (USFG) as local state counterparts (based on the
federal model) began popping up across the country as well. It is estimated that billions
of dollars annually are funneled through the various state and federal offices of Faith-

17

Based and Community Initiative where bids for federal funding would typically be
rewarded to FBOs over their secular counterparts (Roberts-Degennaro and Fogel, 2007,
p. 62). The Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiative has an immense span of
covering international and domestic development and aid. Though the idea of allowing
more service providers to compete for granting does not initially sound problematic, we
can see this is complicated when guidelines specify that grants from this office should not
be put toward conversion or proselytism, however, the previously established lack of
clear legal definitions on proselytism and FBOs left room in the system for many to apply
for an successfully receive funding. As a result of this, lawsuits today against FBOs focus
on claims that funds were misallocated by FBOs whose money appears to go to
endeavors to support conversion instead of support and aid.
Outside of the US more international actors are utilizing FBOs to disperse aid or
sponsoring them to dole out social services. Both of these roles were traditionally served
by the state. Norway in particular has attempted to moderate their FBOs as they fund
them by holding them to the same standard as any typical NGO (Øyhus, 2016; Berge,
2016). The decision to do so has allowed for more accountability and transparency in
evaluating the efficiency of these organizations. The UN has also been more willing to
work with Norwegian NGOs because of the high standard set upon them by Norway as
the moderating government.
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Gaps in the Literature
As more nation-states like the United States set aside funding for FBOs to
perform social services traditionally reserved for the state, little is known about the
efficacy of these programs. Specifically, there is a lack of data when it comes to follow
up on these organizations or to evaluate how faith is integrated in their structures. To put
it another way, FBOs are treated like secular NGOs in regards to ignoring the role faith
plays within structures but FBOs are not documented in terms of their effectiveness in the
manner that many NGOs or state actors are (Kissane, 2007; Ager, 2014). There is a large
gap in the literature about the effectiveness of FBOs social services and this should
require immediate attention as the US government alone funnels billions into these
industries ($1.7 Billion since the early 2000s) (Hefferan, Adkins and Occhipian, 2009, p.
5). Essentially, FBOs are now a prominent player in international aid and should be
treated with the same, if not more closely monitored standards, than their secular NGO
and government actors are.

Conclusion
Faith-based organizations (or FBOs) are an unignorably major actor in
international and domestic development. When traditional actors like the state are unable
or unwilling to care for their citizens experiencing violence through extreme poverty,
conflict, resource shortages, or victim to natural disasters FBOs rally international
networks to get involved in communities. Recognizing the major roles of FBO in our
world today we must also recognize that FBOs have a unique internal structure which
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they use reach areas of the globe when traditional actors find themselves lacking. When
we decide to invest in FBOs or begin to replace traditional social services with FBO
delivered social services, we must recognize that there are implications unmatched to
other players in the development field.
The dangers of “conditional aid” and “proselytism” are a growing concern to
individuals who worry the developed world will exploit or coerce vulnerable
communities into taking on new ideals in order to receive gravely needed resources. The
lack of research surrounding the efficacy of aid calls into question which form of FBOs
we should invest in as structures vary greatly. The decision to invest in FBOs is not only
one we should personally question by weighing the impacts on both sides, but it is also a
reality that billions of dollars are already being invested into this industry. All of these
factors creates an onus on individuals living in a globalized world to engage with FBOs
in their entirety in order to explore questions of ethicality and efficacy.
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Chapter Three: Theory Analysis and Methods
In today’s current political climate, rhetoric has been consistently bastardized as
being synonymous with empty words and devoid of meaningful analysis. As politicians
are accused of spinning rhetorical circles as a means of mitigating action, the public has
begun to feel averse to the mere mention of rhetoric. The tragedy underlying the creation
of this cultural stigma is the loss of one of the most effective tools for critical evaluation
in how individuals and groups function. The study of rhetoric examines how individuals
communicate with one another, through an exchange of words and phrases laden with
meaning, to unearth societal values.
Communication, though used daily by each of us, acts as the primary mechanism
for how individuals find purpose and construct meaning in the world. When individuals
talk to one another, we transmit our values and our perceptions of the world around us as
we articulate our reality and views on life. In this chapter, I use the rhetorical practice of
ideographic critique to unearth how individuals and groups employ certain words and
phrases to create collective identity as well as to motivate action through this
communicative phenomenon.
Specifically, I will look at how ideographs as a rhetorical construct alter the
reality of those who use them. First, I identified the ideographs used in three prominent
FBO organizations: World Vision, Compassion International, and the National
Association of Evangelicals. Based upon coding form their published materials, I analyze
the effectiveness of their ideographs. For instance, what a word like “development”
would typically mean to unattuned audiences, what it means as an ideograph, the
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implications of this hidden meaning, and how utilizing this ideograph creates very real
impacts to communities.
In order to understand the power of rhetoric in not only our day-to-day lives, but
how it can motivate political action for large swaths of people across the globe, it is
important to understand how rhetoric forms individual identity. Dr. Calvin Michael
McGee outlines, “the clearest access to persuasion (and hence to ideology) is through the
discourse used to produce it” (McGee, “The Ideograph,” 1980, p. 427). This important
distinction indicates that ideology is created and transmitted through “discourse,” or the
communicative process of dialoguing with one another. Rhetoric then encompasses the
persuasive attempts of the aforementioned discourse and has a clear relationship with the
formation of ideology. Therefore, ideology and persuasion cannot be separated from
rhetoric.
Faith-based organizations (or FBOs) find themselves in a unique position in
today’s world. These groups exist based on the ideology of the doctrine they choose to
follow. Practitioners of all faiths from all major religions constantly employ rhetoric as
they perform outreach to local and international communities in an effort either to act in
in accordance to their own ideology or to persuade others to adopt the ideology they
preach. Therefore, the study of rhetoric and specifically ideographs (as I describe in my
methods section) in FBO work is crucial as these groups deal in an unprecedented way
with both ideology and discourse. Members of FBOs simultaneously attempt to persuade
others to convert to their ideology, while themselves being motivated to do so by that
same ideology. In fact, those involved in FBOs as individual members, or whole bodies
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of believers, can attest to the power of the “holy word” in forming their identities.
Collective identity formation is a critical end result of the utilization of ideographs—
ideographs being plain language terms that are embedded with new meaning and
ideology to act as dog whistles to communities who recognize this new meaning. To add
an additional complicating layer, the purpose of many FBOs engaging in outreach, such
as evangelical Christians, is to spread their ideology (i.e. the good news of the gospel and
messages of salvation) across the globe. Christian evangelicals specifically aim to
“witness” or “evangelize” to others by coming together and talking to them in an attempt
to persuade individuals to adopt Christian ideology. This process of coming together and
exchanging articulations of meaning and reality is the process of “discourse” that McGee
describes above. In contrast to the bastardization of rhetoric as it is viewed by many in
the US today, rhetoric as it is utilized by FBOs is far from a set of words devoid of
action. Conversely, the rhetoric FBOs use creates cyclical action as it works to create
identity and reinforce new realities by those who internalize the rhetoric of FBOs.
Acknowledging the inherent interactions between rhetoric and individuals in
order to understand the complexities this relationship adds to objective reality. In
McGee’s article on rhetoric’s influence in constituting identity, “In Search of ‘The
People,’” McGee articulates that rhetoric, or “human responses,” “constitute[s] a filter for
‘facts’ which translates them into beliefs” (McGee, ‘In Search of ‘The People,’ 1980, p.
246). Essentially, the rhetoric individuals use to describe reality helps not only to find
meaning but also to create new meaning which acts as a “filter.” This rhetorical “filter”
alters the way in which individuals view the world and “facts” by casting a subjective
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light in which they can opt into how they wish to perceive reality. This is turn forms an
impetus to create beliefs. Based upon these beliefs, individuals experience a renewed
urgency to act. Rhetoricians show that individuals who use persuasive means to expand
and explain the world are engaging in meaning-making as manifested through rhetoric
when engaging in discursive practices. Human interaction, as it manifests through
communication, is both intrinsic to our nature and deeply complex as individuals create
filters and beliefs.
The aim of this chapter is to provide the tools that will allow us to analyze two
different rhetorical phenomena occurring when faith-based organizations engage in
international development and aid. The different realms of rhetoric I examine in the
context of faith-based organizations and international development fall under the
classification of constitutive rhetoric.
According to Kenneth Burke constitutive rhetoric is a form of social identification
that can occur “spontaneously, intuitively, even unconsciously” and is rhetorical by
nature since it is a process rooted in discursive effects “that induce human cooperation”
(Burke, 1968; Charland, 1987, pg. 133). Essentially, constitutive rhetoric is the study of
how individuals come together to form meaning and collective identity as they create
new realities and myths within which they can engage in discursive practices. The above
analysis functions as an overview in how rhetoric permeates every individual’s life as we
create meaning in the world through dialectic experiences. Under this umbrella, I flesh
out the two unique spheres that this paper wants to address: the rhetoric employed in the
field of international development and the rhetorical tradition and practices that faith-
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based organizations rely on. In order to address all three levels of analysis and to
deconstruct the comparative work of the distinct realms, I first outline the communicative
theory needed to identify these structures. Additionally, I want to deconstruct the
meaning embedded into these ideographs in order to carefully examine how these social
constructs create real world impacts across the developed and developing worlds.
Ideographic critique represents one strategy that creates the preliminary
framework to analyze rhetorical filters that create belief and in turn spur action.
Ideographs are rhetorical phenomena that occur in our daily interactions, yet typically go
unnoticed by those who utilize them and are undetected by those outside of the
community. An ideograph is defined as
an ordinary-language term found in political discourse. It is a high-order abstraction
representing collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative
goal. It warrants the use of power, excuses behavior and belief which might otherwise be
perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and guides behavior and belief into channels easily
recognized by a community as acceptable and laudable. (McGee, “The Ideograph,” 1980,
p. 435)
Ideographs are fascinating because those who routinely utilize them in their
vocabulary seldom recognize their significance and those outside of a group may not
understand the weight of seemingly “ordinary-language terms.” Yet these “abstractions”
act as trigger words that can guide groups to act or “condition” individuals to conjure
additional, predetermined meaning when they hear one of these ideographs (“The
Ideograph,” 1980, p. 428). McGee offers a concrete example to illustrate the power of
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ideographs as they function in the real world. Take, for example, “When a claim is
warranted by such terms as ‘law’ [or] ‘liberty,’ . . . it is presumed that human beings will
react predictably and autonomically” (McGee, “The Ideograph,” 1980, p. 428). When
asked what the purpose of “law” or “liberty” entailed, many individuals would reiterate
the phrase as a means in and of itself or list a highly detailed description of the values
embedded into “law” or “liberty.” These are examples of ideographs because they go
beyond the strict dictionary definition of the words. Instead, these words carry weight
because of values embedded into them that are then picked up and used frequently in
discourse both in and outside of the political sphere. Since many Americans would stress
the importance of “rule of law” and “liberty,” it is blatantly evident that these “ill-defined
normative goal[s]” have a “collective commitment.” McGee explains this phenomenon of
pervasive social backing as “a rhetoric of control” in which “a system of persuasion
presumed to be effective on the whole community” has “conditioned” individuals “to a
vocabulary of concepts that function as guides, warrants, reasons, or excuses for behavior
and belief” (“The Ideograph,” 1980, p. 428). Despite the reality that many ideographs are
seldom explicitly defined by communities that use them, similar meanings are
internalized on local, national and international levels.
A clear imperative exists for rhetoric scholars to analyze how social constructs
like ideographs function in order to understand manifestations of social control.
Ultimately, McGee stresses, “the important fact about ideographs is that they exist in real
discourse, functioning clearly and evidently as agents of political consciousness… They
come to be as a part of the lives of the people whose motives they articulate” (“The

26

Ideograph,” 1980, p. 429). Now, some would question the importance of “political
consciousness” when this paper examines the role of faith-based organizations and their
role in international development. Ideographs uniquely provide a lens in which to view
the political consciousness that occurs as a result of the church as a social institution. As
previously deconstructed, ideographs craft belief systems that create an impetus for
individuals to act; ideographs are also uniquely reinforced with the ideals a group
chooses to bestow on them. Despite existing as an abstract social construct, ideographs
become as real to the people that use them as their actions that exist within the real world.
Secondarily, ideographs seldom exist on their own. Instead, ideographs function
best when strung together or built upon, like “building blocks of ideology” (McGee,
1980, p. 248). Not only does this process of layering ideology add new complexity to the
individual term, it also provides individuals insight as “an ideograph . . . is always
understood in its relation to another; it is defined tautologically by using other terms in its
cluster” (McGee, “The Ideograph,” 1980, p. 434). By recognizing that ideographs are the
components that make up a collective belief, it is clear that the power of ideographs
derives from the collective. We analyze the components of the collective identity, of the
mythic reality, in order to understand how and why those that choose to identify with it
function the way they do.
The purpose of this methods section is to understand how ideographs function in
order to highlight ideographs being used in in intercultural and interfaith dialogue that
faith-based organizations are engaging in when they enter into international development.
In my chapter on analysis, I unpack what phrases like “the body of Christ,”
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“stewardship,” “witnessing,” and “holistic development” mean as they function together.
Independently they are all ideographs but when stacked upon each other like ideological
building blocks, a new, more complex view forms. I will deconstruct the motivations and
value system of those working with the FBO to deliver aid as well as begin to analyze the
impacts that those receiving aid in the Global South experience through this close
examination of ideographs “in its cluster.”
The simplest micro-example of ideographs frequently employed by FBOs are
their propensity to reference “evangelizing” and “witnessing” in place of proselytism.
Proselytism typically refers to “end-directed efforts to spread faith through conversion”
(Fletcher, 2014, p. 67; Stanhke, 1999, pp. 255-6) or more critically, “defined as actively
promoting conversion to a particular ideology or religion or otherwise pressuring
potential converts to accord with specific norms and practices” (Lynch and Schwartz,
2016, p. 60). While proselytism is typically frowned upon by FBOs and the international
community (Fletcher, 2014, p. 68) the lack of binding legal definition means that
proselytism conduct is still hotly debated among FBO members and participants.
However, witnessing and evangelizing fall outside this scrutiny as those out of the
community do not recognize the extra meaning embedded into these seemingly plain
language terms—rather they seem innocuous. Yet, witnessing and evangelizing are also
defined through subjective means depending on the individual or individual organizations
utilizing that rhetoric. The lack of clear legal definitions around all three of these
buzzwords have resulted in stigma around the word “proselytism” with some nations
banning missionaries entering into their country on the basis of proselytism. Yet, using
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phrases like evangelizing and witnessing effectively act as a de facto form of proselytism
on a massive scale (Fletcher, 2014, p. 68).
Witnessing and evangelizing are ideographs because to those who identify with
the Religious Right, and specifically evangelicals, these words represent their ideological
obligation to follow The Great Commission of Jesus. Subsequently, these words are
revered as part of their identity and as a transition between ideology to group action. To
outsiders, “witnessing” would simply mean the act of listening to or testifying about their
faith and “evangelizing” means to spread the good news. In reality, the tactics of
“witnessing” and “evangelizing” do more than to simply encourage or watch passively.
They are descriptors for any tactics that an FBO utilizes for outreach. Using platforms
like soup kitchens, delivering emergency aid after natural disasters, or handing out
diapers in at-risk neighborhood to needy mothers would all provide opportunities for
FBOs to “witness” or “evangelize” spreading their ideology to those who accept these
donations. Some FBOs will even refuse to deliver these goods and services until after
they have had an opportunity to engage in outreach, creating conditionality to their aid.
Through the examination of the practices FBOs utilize when witnessing and
evangelizing, it is evident that proselytism is repeated almost exactly in international aid
and development yet undetected due to this rhetorical phenomenon in which members
who know these ideographs will feel justified in their actions without seeing how
coercive their actions truly are.
Ideographs are often undetected language terms in common discourse yet hold
significant weight insofar as they form collective responses that lead individuals into
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group thought and action. The critical aspect of ideographs derive from how ideographs
are employed as building blocks, not simply their meaning taken on face. To think about
this another way, consider Legos. Legos individually are incredibly unique as they come
in a variety of colors, shapes and sizes. Yet, they are not valued individually. Instead,
Lego building blocks matter when they are stacked upon one another to create a building
or new entity. These seemingly plain blocks can completely transform a cluster of
individual blocks as they come together. Ideographs within an FBO context function
identically. While “witnessing” and “the body of Christ” illicit various group actions and
ideological triggers, by utilizing these phrases together in clusters, groups form a
collective identity and form subsequent collective myths that craft a new reality for actors
in FBOs to situate themselves.

Constitutive Rhetoric
Rhetorical scholars refer to the process of creating new realities as myth creation.
McGee claims that, “the heart of the collectivization process is a political myth” (McGee,
“In Search of ‘The People,’” 1975, p. 243). McGee describes myths in this context as
not descriptions of things, but expressions of a determination to act… A myth… is, at
bottom identical with the convictions of a group, being the expression of those
convictions in the language of movement; and it is, in consequence, unanalyzable into
parts which could be placed on the plane of historical description. (“In Search of ‘The
People,’” 1975)
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When individuals come together to form a collective they buy into a larger collaboration
in which they can be unified with others in thought and action. This is what is referred to
as the “collectivization process.” As the group creates a myth to situate a reality to reside
within, convictions manifest within the movement. The unique mythic component is that
through the formation of the collective identity, the group can even transcend “historical
description” as it becomes a living entity. Individuals then can elect to live in a “more
comfortable . . . alternate reality” they create rather than having to abide in a world where
they have found no meaning or place for their unique identity, or “so called ‘objective
reality’” (McGee, “In Search of ‘The People,’” 1975). Individuals in groups create new
realities or fall into “false consciousnesses” as they create meaning in the world through
dialogue. They remain situated in these myths even while the myths act as a new filter or
lens which themselves create new “expressions” and “determinations to act.”
As I will cover in my analysis chapters, members of FBOs create and exist in
mythic realities as they come together to form groups. The very nature of being a faithfounded collective is critical to both the identity formation of the individuals who
compose the collective and to the end goal of the group in their desire to consolidate their
faith-based network. Therefore, the nature of the groups formed in these political myths
can vary dramatically. For instance, the collectivization process may refer to individuals
becoming one unit as the “the body of Christ” or as individuals doing the work of their
god. On the other end of this interaction, those who receive aid may find themselves
developing a new identity as potential converts or new disciples depending on the myths
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that are introduced to them and their community when FBOs enter their homes,
neighborhoods, and nations.
McGee introduced ideographs and their subsequent role in constitutive rhetoric to
academia in his articles “In Search of ‘The People’” and “The Ideograph.” Building upon
this tradition, two schools of thought budded. Dana Cloud in her work “The rhetoric of
<family values>: scapegoating, utopia and the privatization of social responsibility” and
from Condit and Lucaites in their book Crafting Equality offered two variations of
ideographic critique. The two distinct deviations represented in these two schools of
thought are, first, Condit’s and Lucaite’s belief that ideographs are neutral vessels, and
second, Cloud’s interpretation that ideographs are inherently dominative and oppressive
to vulnerable groups. Condit and Lucaites outline in their book Crafting Equality the
public nature of ideographs as they examine phrases like “equality” and “liberty.” Condit
and Lucaites argue that ideographs construct a public “set of identifications and
commitments” while Cloud believes that an ideograph like <family values> is a
privatized identity (Cloud, 1998, p. 391) which then in turn causes individuals to act.
However, the private/public distinction pales in comparison to the major clash deriving
from Cloud and Condit and Lucaites. Cloud builds upon McGee’s original beliefs that
ideographs 1) are inherently vessels that foster domination of people vulnerable to
exploitation, and 2) that ideographs can be used to oppress populations through adopting
charged ideographs in political rhetoric (See Cloud’s <family values>). Condit and
Lucaites, on the other hand, believe that ideographs are neutral vessels, devoid of malice
or other intent.
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I have chosen to follow Cloud’s interpretation because I believe that ideographs
contain an inherent element of manipulation and are thus easily used to oppress
marginalized populations. They are embedded with meaning which is then used to
achieve the motives and goals of the group that created or normalized this rhetoric. In the
same way that one cannot help but to create a rhetorical filter of how they view the world
and alter facts, as McGee argues, I agree with Cloud that through the very nature of
embedding meaning and constantly utilizing these terms in a self-feeding loop, thus it is
imperative to acknowledge that “the dimension of social control and coercion in
understanding the ideograph is crucial” (Cloud, 1998, p. 389). This does not mean that
individuals maliciously create ideographs to oppress and dominate those who are
vulnerable. Rather, it is simply a result of the human condition that our own biases
influence how we view, create, and articulate our reality. Logically, when individuals
engage in discursive activities to share those views then we subsequently pass along
those biases and views, whether intentionally or unintentionally.
The final distinction between ideographic criticism in the two major schools of
thought is the methodology each party utilizes in their analysis. While McGee outlines
two different approaches Cloud prefers a diachronic method of analysis, conversely,
Condit and Lucaites employ a synchronic method. In their text Crafting Equality, Condit
and Lucaites utilize the diachronic approach which traces the usage of the ideograph
“equality” back decades and documents the evolutions of this ideograph over time in
order to discern its impacts on individuals. Specifically, Condit and Lucaites note, “The
diachronic structure of an ideograph represents the full range and history of its usages for
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a particular rhetorical culture” (Crafting Equality, 1993, p. xiii). Conversely, Cloud
prefers to use a synchronic approach in her analysis of <family values> and ideograph
clusters like “responsibility” or “opportunity.” She follows McGee’s preferred approach
to “discover the functional meaning of the term by measure of its grammatic and
pragmatic context” (McGee, “The Ideograph,” 1980, p. 432).
In my study, I adopt Cloud and McGee’s synchronic approach. I believe that the
behavior of faith-based organizations as they administer social services on the ground
today is uniquely important to examine. Additionally, due to the current rising trend of
FBOs’ growing presence in international aid, it is important to limit the scale of my
analysis to how ideographs are being employed now; as current trends indicate the
greatest significance to these ideographs. Finally, using a synchronic methodology I
believe I can cover more ideographs and analyze how they function in clusters more
efficiently to best discern how constitutive rhetoric influences those who give and receive
aid from FBOs. A diachronic approach limits the span of analysis I am able to do on
multiple ideographs due to time constraints afford by the limitation of this project.
Therefore, I have chosen to follow Dr. Cloud’s interpretation and method of analysis on
ideographs in order to evaluate their role in identity construction for FBOs.
A synchronic approach yields the best analysis of clusters for ideographs, while
the narrow focus of the diachronic method is better suited to analyze the history and
evolution of specific ideographs. McGee stresses the importance of deconstructing
meaning from clusters of ideographs as he explains, “such structures appear to be
‘diachronic’ and ‘synchronic’ patterns of political consciousness which have the capacity
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both to control ‘power’ and to influence (if not determine) the shape and texture of each
individual’s ‘reality’” (McGee, “The Ideograph,” 1980, p. 427). It is important to
recognize that rhetoric, as manifested through ideographs, not only functions as a way
individuals embed meaning into particular words; rhetoric also allows individuals to
“determine the shape and texture” of the reality they elect to live in.
The importance of ideographs in rhetorical analysis derives from how they come
together to constitute identity. McGee bridges this transition from ideograph as a single
unit of analysis to the function of ideographs in constituting identity in his article “In
Search of ‘The People.’” Ideographs do not exist in a vacuum devoid of interaction, so to
analyze them in such a vacuum is counterproductive. The political myths that are
generated through collectivization processes become the foundation to understanding
how identity is constituted. McGee begins this conversation by showing that
groups, whether as small as a Sunday school class or as big as a whole society, are infused
with an artificial identity. So from a rhetorical perspective, the entire socialization process
is nothing but intensive and continual exercises in persuasion: Individuals must be seduced
into abandoning their individuality, convinced of their sociality . . . (McGee, “In Search of
‘The People;’” 1975)
As individuals abandon their own “individuality” in favor of joining an “artificial
identity” they begin to infuse life into these narratives. Political myths, “false
consciousness,” and these new realities which constitute identity are not static. They are
living entities that take on lives of their own as “persons begin to respond to a myth, not
only by exhibiting collective behavior, but also by publicly ratifying the transaction
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wherein they give up control over their individual destinies for sake of a dream” (McGee,
1975, p. 243). The responsive element is unique to adding life to the myth which in turn
sparks action of participants as well as adds legitimacy to this new “alternate reality” or
“artificial identity.”
Scholars like Maurice Charland build off McGee’s analysis of ideographs and
their role in constitutive rhetoric by introducing a clear case study of how groups form
through the rhetorical collectivization process. The result of these processes creates
artificial realities which become real and transhistorical as evidenced in Charland’s
article “Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the Peuple Quebecois.” Charland argues
“collective identities” form the “basis of rhetorical appeals” because “the people
Quebecois” and “peoples” in general exist only through an ideological discourse that
constitutes them (Charland, 1987, p. 139). So in the same way that French Canadians
retroactively wrote themselves into history as articulated by their white paper, their
identity of “Quebecois” became more than merely a descriptive term, it became a living
entity. Evangelicals view their role similarly insofar as they will find identity as a
collective and work to contribute to be active participants as members of “the body of
Christ” because “the body” lives through the constant ideological discourse that people
have with one another. In both cases, these identity descriptors, evangelical and
Quebecois, are not only real to the individuals that form in the collective, but they are
alive as they help individuals find meaning in the world through these identities. The
“collective identities” then are not simply fictitious. The “collective identities” are
simultaneously fictitious and real because the individuals who buy into this “artificial
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reality” have accepted “living within a political myth” (Charland, 1987, p. 138) and have
allowed individuals to create a new reality in which to reside.
After observing a group that appears to have a collective identity, there are three
criteria, or standards, that allow scholars to determine if constitutive rhetoric has been
employed in a group. The first is that the group must form into a collective subject. This
goes beyond typical social cohesion, rather it manifests as individuals choose how they
want to identify and to some extent “abandon . . . their individuality, convinced of their
sociality . . .” (McGee, “In Search of ‘The People,’” 1975, p. 242). When ideographs are
strung together they form a collective subject, or as McGee would articulate “the people.”
There can be multiple “people” or bodies formed as a result of constitutive rhetoric—a
“people” is not confined to nationality, ethnicity or any other traits unless the group
chooses to create an identity focusing on these characteristics. For example, a common
illustration of constitutive rhetoric crafted by an ideograph is the way individuals buy into
nationalistic conceptions of what it means to be an “American.” Those who view
themselves as Americans, and any additional meaning they want to embed into this title,
may also buy into other constitutive identities like, for example, to be an active member
in the “body of Christ” as a Catholic. Using ideographs as identity markers represents the
first standard to uncovering the political myths that collective identities are forged within.
The second criteria is that the “people” (a.k.a. the collective identity) must ascribe
to becoming a transhistorative subject. Or to put it more simply, the process of a group of
individuals coming together, prescribing a collective history to the group, and the
resulting collective action they partake in directly evidences how rhetoric constructs the
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reality they live in. This simply underscores the living nature of constitutive rhetoric and
the extensiveness of “false consciousness.” Again, looking back to Charland’s analysis of
the People Quebecois. This title had not existed previously and yet, when this group came
together, they were able to rewrite history and assert that their group had existed all along
in publishing a white paper. Legitimacy was granted to their group and within their group
when they were able to prescribe a shared history for members.
Finally, ritual is used to reinforce the new reality intrinsic to the nature of the
constitutive identity of the group. Ritual functions as a binding process in which the
expectation of social participation serves to cohesively grow the experiences of the
group. This may manifest in partaking in traditional practices such as partaking in
communion or daily group prayer, listening to sermons on a weekly basis to re-establish
ideology, or through a recurring practice of giving and receiving with set roles for both
participants. Regardless of the traditions they undertake, rituals bind together individuals
through common experience; partner this with the power of creating a new narrative (i.e.
shared history) and the danger of constitutive rhetoric begin to unfold as groups will
sacrifice individual identity to join the collective. Having joined, the collective members
are more likely to define themselves based on this identity, think as a group, and act as a
unified body.
Though constitutive rhetoric may not initially sound harmful, it is important to
realize the danger manifests in practice, not theory alone. Specifically, Charland explains,
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The significance of constitutive rhetoric is that it positions the reader towards political,
social, and economic action in the material world and it is in this positioning that its
ideological character becomes significant. (Charland, 1987, p. 140)
For FBOs, and evangelical FBOs specifically, the most significant thing to them is their
“ideological character;” as ideology is not only their starting motivation but it is also the
end goal they hope to disseminate through their outreach in international aid and
development. What I aim to prove in this paper is that once we are able to prove the
legitimacy of groups’ existence through rhetorical construction, we need to recognize that
there are no actions the group will not utilize if at the groups disposal (e.g. political,
social, and economic action).
“The Body” the church creates also provides a unique interpretation of how
ideologies become “material practices” or manifests as real-world action by a large group
across the globe. Charland explicates, “The unique power deriving from constitutive
rhetoric is that it is action oriented” (Charland, 1987, p. 143). This is because “ideology is
material:” it does not exist in the realm of the hypothetical but is geared toward “material
practices” (Charland, 1987, p.143). According to the church, Jesus calls his followers to
create “fishers of men” and make disciples of the world. Christians, Buddhists, Muslims
and Hindus are also charged with caring for the poor and vulnerable. Their ideologies
clearly not only impact their actions but even constitute the reason that millions across
the world choose to act. Whether someone works in a soup kitchen, volunteers with an
NGO, or makes sure their neighbor has their material needs satisfied, it is blatantly
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evident that religion, and specifically faith-based organizations, have clear material
impacts on those they interact with.
When “the people” and bodies are threatened then the group adopts a unique
justification for taking action and a newfound sense of urgency. Take, for example, the
self-described narrative of the “People Quebecois” which “concludes by identifying a
threat to its very existence as a narrative” (Charland, 1987, p. 146). A major component
of their story, and the validity of the group’s existence writ large, is based on the idea that
their group is cited as existing in opposition to others. So not only did the Quebecois
want to illustrate their presence throughout history, but also that they had to fight for
legitimacy. Today, the Christian church behaves very similarly in creating narratives of
persecution. Many evangelical churches employ rhetoric of Christian persecution to
explain why their ministry is under attack worldwide through persecution by nonbelievers, or how God is being attacked in public schools by not allowing prayer in
classrooms (Marsden, 2008, p. 115). Highlighting these stories creates an urgency to act
(either by soliciting donations, strengthening the call for outreach, or increased intergroup
communication through prayer). In total, the threat of persecution prompts continued
action and binds together the group through a mentality that their purpose is even more
important because their existence is at stake. This can lead to more radical action using
any means the group has access to. This is problematic when the group has access to
social, political, or economic means, and this becomes even more concerning when we
recognize that the means FBOs use when engaging internationally typically look like
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development work and aid relief (specially, utilizing programs that administer education,
workfare, and delivering social services like health care to impoverished communities).
Using these three standards to determine if constitutive rhetoric has been
employed is a litmus test of dire importance in reviewing the work of FBOs for two
reasons. First, it is critical to see if FBOs exist within certain “political myths,” because
depending on which myths they view as reality, their subsequent actions will be
influenced by their perception as they spread their ideology to the Global South through
development work and aid relief in a nuanced form of Western imperialism. It may also
influence the forms of persuasion tactics they use (e.g. the fine line between “witnessing”
and proselytism). Or even more problematically, based on the rhetoric that FBOs use
when administering aid and social services, new groups can be unintentionally created as
a result of constitutive rhetoric disseminated by FBOs. Thus, FBOs cannot be treated as
though they exist in a vacuum. If FBOs and their rhetoric are not examined then the
myths they reside in are allowed to spread as they come into discursive contact with other
groups who reside in different political myths or are situated in alternative perceptions of
reality.
The most important component of ideographs to remember is that “The
significance of ideographs is in their concrete history as usages, not in their alleged ideacontent” (McGee, “The Ideograph,” 1980, p. 431). Regardless of the benevolent
intentions of the creator who embedded meaning into these terms or the community that
consolidates meaning through their interaction and usage of ideographs, their concrete
“usages” are what I analyze in this paper. Much of the rhetoric used by FBOs carry a
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much different meaning than their “alleged idea-content,” and so the actual usages are
particularly relevant here (McGee, “The Ideograph,” 1980, p. 431).

Conclusion for Methods
I will employ ideographic criticism (as defined by Dr. Dana Cloud) and an
analysis of constitutive rhetoric in regards to faith-based organizations and the work they
do in international aid. This work is particularly important because today FBOs find
themselves administering billions of dollars for ever-increasing social services around the
globe with a shocking lack of accountability. Accountability here references both the lack
of monitoring what materials, rhetoric, and practices these FBO utilize while on the
ground when administering social services, as well as checking outcomes versus funds
raised 1. I argue that FBOs, due to their growing presence and influence, need
accountability in regards to how do outreach to poor, marginalized communities. Most
importantly, a critical examination of the rhetoric they employ to potential donors, the
church body, and individuals on the ground in developing nations is critical in
understanding intentional and unintentional outcomes resulting from FBOs’ presence.
Without this critical examination, there can be no true measure of accountability on the

1

This is not to say that faith-based organizations have no financial accountability; in fact, for
NGOs writ large accountability is a unique hurdle to overcome as they have pressure from donors
to keep administrative costs low. However, without administrators to monitor progress and
effective spending there is no way to have accountable practices and checks from year to year.
(Singer, Ethics in the Real World, “Holding Charities Accountable” 163-167)
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outcome of FBOs’ efforts, which means we risk hurting the very groups whom FBOs are
committed to serving: the most vulnerable.
In order to perform this examination, I dissect the published work of three
prominent organizations. The first two, Compassion International and World Vision, are
two of the largest FBOs in existence. Compassion International received approximately
$800 million in contributions and gifts in the 2016 fiscal year alone and describes itself as
follows:
“Compassion International is a Christian child development organization that
works to release children from poverty in Jesus’ name. Compassion revolutionized
the fight against global poverty by working exclusively with the Church to lift
children out of spiritual, economic, social and physical poverty. Compassion
partners with more than 6,700 churches in 25 countries to deliver its holistic child
development program to over 1.8 million babies, children and young adults. It is
the only child sponsorship program to be validated through independent, empirical
research.” (“About Us,” 2018)
Compassion International, based out of Colorado Springs, Colorado, represents the most
traditional model of FBO. As explained in the literature review, there are four essential
structures of FBOs. Compassion International falls into the model which is founded on
Biblical principles, incorporates faith principles and practices into their deliverance of
social services, and bases successful outcomes on conversions of participants to faith
goals (as reflected in the pitches they submit to their Christian donor base). Compassion
International is known in the international nonprofit world for two unique characteristics.
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First, Compassion Child is a child sponsorship program that interacts with millions of
children across the globe since 1952. Secondly, Compassion International is infamous for
its proselytism. I want to highlight and analyze their work and rhetoric because their
influence across the world is apparent. The question then becomes how their rhetoric and
influence translate what they tell the church body to the individuals they deliver aid to.
By unearthing these tensions we can describe not only whether or not Compassion
International is guilty of proselytism but also unearth the largely societal implications of
their involvement.
The second FBO I analyze is World Vision. World Vision is known by some as
“the Walmart of FBOs.” Doling out a record number of $835 million in 2016 alone for
international outreach, World Vision is a major player in international aid and
development, as well as one of the largest FBOs across the globe. This is not
coincidental, the former vice president of World Vision, Andrew Natsios was appointed
Director of the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (a branch under USAID)
under President George W. Bush and to this day World Vision receives approximately
23% of their operating revenue from public grants. In order to understand World Vision’s
rhetorical impact I will look at the literature they have published on their website and
compare it to that of Compassion International. World Vision, while also a large FBO
which offers child sponsorship problems, embodies a different form of FBO. This form,
as described in the literature review, references individuals founded on Biblical principles
that do not require, implicitly or explicitly, individuals to convert to their faith in order to
receive aid or social services. World Vision also generates funds from private donors
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(church bodies) as well as receiving a substantial amount of government funding to
deliver US development overseas. Last year alone World Vision received over $200
million from United States Aid and International Development agency (USAID).
Finally, I analyze literature published by the National Association of Evangelicals
(NEA) and the outreach projects they endorse. The reality of most FBOs is that they are
not large multi-million dollar organizations like World Vision and Compassion
International. Rather the majority are small churches who self-fund to take on mission
work in other countries. These missions may entail aiding in social services (teaching
English, building wells, etc.) for various durations of time. Long term and short-term
service trips and mission work are a national phenomenon. Through self-funding, church
sponsorship or even institutional sponsorship (for example when faith-backed universities
like Regis send students to volunteer, or large foundations set aside money for FBOs like
The Opus Foundation) leave FBOs in a precarious position because they exist in a “pay
to engage” sphere. As long as they can accrue funds to travel, they can preach, partake in
any outreach they so choose, and engage with the community in any way the community
will allow. By looking at smaller churches, the NEA, and responses to this kind of work,
I will examine the remaining two forms of FBO models and be able to apply and contrast
the efficiency and efficacy of these models.
The type of artifacts I will be exploring for my rhetorical analysis are various
texts the above specified FBOs publish on themselves for fundraising purposes, to
maintain good public relations, and responses by news sources, video comments and blog
posts. These response texts are critical in analyzing how members of the church view
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their work in an authentic, non-censored way as well as individuals on the other side of
the interaction. By the nature of international aid and development work, we seldom hear
responses from those who have received the aid. Beyond typical cultural barriers (like
language), the populations FBOs target are uniquely sought out for being known as
marginalized or “at-risk.” Typically, this means FBOs seek out individuals living in
poverty in the Global South with limited access to platforms that would allow them to
vocalize dissent against these groups that bring in aid, social services, and infrastructure.
Instead these groups get to choose what voices get heard when they publish their
experiences and include narratives in their promotional material. Blogs, video comments
on platforms like YouTube, or comments on news articles are the only places I can mine
for information from members of the church who aren’t controlling the broadcasted
narrative of the FBO because these platforms do not have a substantial barrier of entry for
individuals on the other side of the development spectrum. Anyone can post to these
destinations which is both a blessing and a curse. It can be immensely difficult to verify
these sources so the majority of my analysis will come from verified sources like
accredited journals, scholarly peer-reviewed articles for case studies, the website of the
specified organization and verified news sources. However, it is important not to discount
more informal sources in order to glean ideographs as they trickle down to individuals
across the globe.
I will be looking for ideographs in two contexts. The first context is the sphere in
which ideographs are used by FBOs to garner support by fellow believers and the second
is how the church reaches out to non-believers or secular entities like the United States
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Federal Government (USFG). It is important to recognize that two spheres exist within
the donation and fundraising realm as sometimes churches will cater to both church
members and the government. The only way to garner funds from both sources is to use
ideographs that act as dog whistles or code words to believers and that those outside of
the group would not see significance in. But secondly, and more importantly, it is
important to see if the way what rhetoric creates new realities and new myths once it
leaves US soil. Looking at sermons, pamphlets, and sociological studies documenting
decades of evangelizing presence unearths how FBOs create big impacts, regardless of
their intentions. Once again, I am choosing to utilize Cloud’s definition of ideographs
because she illustrates that regardless of intentions, the way we utilize rhetoric and
language can constitute new realities and new social norms. Thus, these artifacts are key
to understanding the intentional and unintentional outcomes which result from FBOs
work in international development and aid.
The last caveat to consider as I conclude my methods section is why I am
narrowing my research to Christian, and specifically evangelical organizations. Not only
do charismatic evangelical churches represent “the fastest growing movement in the
world” (Farley, 2014, p. 15), Christian evangelical churches are heavily involved in
international aid and development due to their call to “evangelize” and engage in
outreach. Additionally, while faith-based organizations can derive from any spirituality
and religion, the United States allocates a disproportionate amount of funding to
Christian FBOs. In fact, in a large exposé published by the Boston Globe in 2006, it was
revealed that 98% of the funds from the Office of Faith Based Initiatives and Community
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Initiatives were allocated to Christian FBOs (Stockman et al., 2006). Since the creation of
this office in President George W. Bush’s first term, hundreds of millions of dollars have
been siphoned off from USAID and funneled to FBOs (Marsden, 2008, p. 126). In my
next chapter I will further explain the power that Christianity holds in American politics
and the power Christians have had domestically and abroad in transforming policy. By
deconstructing the influence of Christianity in American politics, we realize that
“political myths are purely rhetorical phenomena” (McGee, “In Search of ‘The People,’”
1975, p. 247) but are nonetheless able to create new mythic realities like the ones these
groups have created in countries like South Sudan, Nicaragua, and Uganda, as well as
here at home in the United States. Causing, in turn, this rhetorical phenomena of
constitutive identity and the creation of “political myths” to be solidified in the very real
creation of governmental policy.
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Chapter Four: Identity Creation in International Aid and Development

Development as an Ideograph
This chapter begins to weave the theoretical implications of ideographs and
constitutive rhetoric with development literature. Specifically, by looking at the
ideograph of development I argue the importance of discernment for the various types of
FBOs. The second half of the chapter explores how individuals with the best of intentions
can inadvertently harm communities due to the precarious relationship between donors
and recipients of development resources and aid. This is further complicated due to the
rhetorical intricacies both groups engage with.
Ideographs utilized in religious and faith-based organizations are not a recent
phenomenon. As discussed previously, the “body of Christ” has existed as a major
component of the Christian church since its insemination. Over the centuries, the church
and the “body” have evolved to adapt Christian doctrine to “divinely revealed” dogma
meant to highlight or insert the Church’s positions on relevant societal issues of the day.
Conversely, ideographs used in development are not a recent phenomenon either. In fact,
one of the largest ideographs to exist is the phrase “development” itself when referring to
humanitarian or community outreach work on international and domestic scales.
Development is a largely empty term which has had meaning embedded into it since its
creation. Webster’s Dictionary defines development as “the act or process of causing
something to grow or become larger or more advanced.” The first time development was
introduced in regards to international aid was in President Truman’s inaugural address in
1949 in which he introduced the idea of “developed” and “underdeveloped” countries.
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Over time, this terminology and subsequent humanitarian aid work led to the creation of
an industry of nonprofits and government organizations in the pursuit of “good works” in
countries outside of the global North. But the question still remains, what precisely is
development work? As a common language term we can understand that it encompasses
advancement in some form, however, advancement in and of itself is an incredibly
nebulous term. Further, “advancement” is an entirely relative term subject to varying
cultural interpretations. Since the UN was founded in 1945, “development” has evolved
and been refined into an ideograph utilized by the United Nations, their partners, and
member nation states as growth “that promotes prosperity and economic opportunity,
greater social well-being, and protection of the environment” (“Promote Sustainable
Development,” n.d.). The variable then becomes how one is able to/will pursue
sustainable development. I argue that depending on the entity, not only does the pursuit
vary greatly but that “development,” as defined by the international community, can be
coopted to fit the objectives of the specific entity engaging in humanitarian work. With
development work being a multi-billion dollar industry that engages countless individuals
and communities across the globe, it becomes even more important to realize that abstract
goal setting or any processes that depend on mutual understanding of ideographs can be
subject to extreme variation in outcomes, and potentially even exploitation.
Faith-based organizations (FBOs) uniquely have coopted the ideograph of
“development” in a way that allows them to continue to engage with the common held
conception of “development” while also allowing them to embed additional meaning that
only their constituents would understand. Or to put this another way, FBOs are able to
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work effectively in the sphere of development because they are acutely attuned and know
how to use buzzwords like “development” and “empowerment” when interacting in the
community; but they have also masked in plain sight a complicated additional meaning
that only fellow members would be privy to. Specifically, FBOs have coopted the
ideograph of “development” and expanded it to “holistic development” and
“transformation” as evidenced in their literature. Through deconstruction of these
ideographs, we can glean insight as to FBOs true development goals and begin to
elucidate the means they may use to pursue said objectives. Upon understanding these
goals, we can then juxtapose how a religious entity might pursue development differently
than their separate secular counterparts.
Compassion International and World Vision are both renowned as two of the largest
FBOs in international development. Both identify as child development organizations
with special focuses on “transformation” and “holistic development” through their child
sponsorship programs 2. For context, child sponsorship programs entail collecting a
monthly donation from an affluent donor in order to sponsor the education and needs of a
child in a developing country. Each organization varies in the parameters they set for the
relationship between donor and child. For the Compassion Child program, you can select
a child based on their name, age, gender, ethnicity, picture, country of origin, birthday,
etc. Donors are then able to write monthly correspondence with the child where the child

2

They also engage in other forms of international development and aid work. However, their
child sponsorship is one of their most well-known programs and clearest source of documentation
on their websites.
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will respond. Compassion International will also orchestrate mission trips where donors
can meet and visit their Compassion Child in the child’s country.
Compassion International (CI) and World Vision (WV) both attest to the strengths of
“holistic development” in all of their work and specifically in their Child Sponsorship
programs. On the surface “holistic development” may sound like an empty buzzword.
One would assume that within the context of development that holistic development
would mean to take careful consideration to not leave any aspect of community or
individual advancement behind. To those without a religious backing this may conjure an
image of development work that encompasses economic, sociopolitical, cultural, and
environmental factors in both long term and short-term capacities. However, for religious
communities this is a very clear code word for development that will encompass faith.
Through inspection on Compassion Child’s website and uniquely their page for donors
titled “Our Commitment to You,” the nature of “holistic development” becomes explicit:
“We commit to holistic child development — developing minds, bodies and spirits. All
of our child development programs provide opportunities that encourage healthy
development in four areas — spiritual, physical, social and economic” (“Compassion
International: Commitment,” 2018).
World Vision offers similar rhetoric but present it initially in a more subtle manner.
On their “Child Sponsorship FAQ” page, WV explains their goals and alludes to their
methods,
We see a world where each child experiences fullness of life, and we know this can only
be achieved by addressing the problems of poverty and injustice in a holistic way—that is
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how World Vision is unique. . . . We bring all of our skills across many areas of expertise
to each community where we work, enabling us to care for children’s physical, social,
emotional, and spiritual well-being… Our holistic approach—which can include digging
wells, teaching new farming skills, training community leaders and much more—makes
the difference between short-term fixes and long-term self-sufficiency. (“World Vision:
Child Sponsorship FAQ,” 2018)
Notice that “holistic approach” and “holistic way” implicitly apply a spiritual emphasis
(“enabling care for . . . spiritual well-being,” “training community leaders and much
more”). Not only does this fail to address what leaders are being trained in, where in the
community these leaders come from, or the incredibly vague content of “much more,”
this leaves out the major component that World Vision administers almost all of their
services through their local church partners in over 100 countries across the world. While
World Vision has done some interfaith outreach to Muslims in mosques, their church
partnerships are predominantly Christian. World Vision is a prominent actor, in 2016
alone the president of World Vision Richard Stearns highlighted in WVI’s Annual Fiscal
Report that “the total value of private and public donations to World Vision US this year
totaled $1.014 billion” (2016, p. 1) which allowed them to work with 41 million children
and families across the globe. World vision also “…responded to 130 humanitarian
emergencies around the world offering a second chance to 15.4 million disaster survivors,
refugees and displaced people” (“WV: 2016 Fiscal Report,” 2016). World Vision is an
undeniable powerhouse and the influence they exert is tangible so it is imperative to
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discover what the goals and methods they employ entail in order to assess the efficacy,
efficiency, and whether or not the USFG should continue giving them funding.
Upon further exploration of World Vision’s published materials, one member’s
editorial makes a palpable connection to the ideographs of “holistic” and “development”
than the carefully censured WV’s stance previously mentioned. In a piece titled, “Are
Christian charities more effective at humanitarian work?” Rachael Boyer writes, “If we
simply did humanitarian work with no faith component, we wouldn’t be holistically
taking care of people—mind, body, and spirit. We would leave the puzzle incomplete
because the roots of poverty are often spiritual” (2017). Through examining a member of
the organization’s rhetoric, a better image of what is actually taught within the
organization comes to light. To believe that the “roots of poverty are often spiritual”
indicates that tending to spiritual needs is much more important that initially alluded to.
McGee explains that to determine the content of an ideograph, or the ideology being
embedded in to it, we need to look at other words in the cluster. In this case, the content
indicates that any “humanitarian work” or “development” work World Vision engages in
will always carry this lens of a Christian charity and the focuses will be “holistic” by
creating a unique weight on the spiritual component. Now, reflect back to the original
passage from World Vision in which they claim “addressing the problems of poverty and
injustice in a holistic way” is critical to their goal and approach. Understanding
ideographs as ideological indicators, we can see how someone who has experiences in
Christian narratives will be conditioned to understand “holistic development” as an
ideograph either by listening to marketing material from FBOs like Compassion Child
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and World Vision presented in church or sitting in the pews on Sunday. For individuals
with this Christian context or an individual like Rachael Boyer, this statement from
World Vision would not seem vague or subtle in the slightest.
In some ways this is masterful, and may have resulted unintentionally as a genuine
miscommunication where each side assumes the other knows what both groups are
talking about. Regardless of how this occurred, the process of coopting an ideograph
creates a unique communicative phenomenon. On the one hand, secular non-profits,
government entities, grantors, etc. may believe they understand the ideology and
additional meaning accompanying terms that an FBO will use to describe their work in
reports or grant applications such “development,” “holistic approach,” or
“empowerment.” These secular organizations may even genuinely believe their goals are
identical, thinking “How different can our approaches to development truly be?” Yet, as
McGee states, due to the lack of conditioning to these ideographs they may have no idea
the extent of ideology that is being conveyed through the use of the particular ideographs
by an FBO since they will appear as common language term to the unsuspecting.
Development has been coded in the Christian community to go beyond the traditional
dictionary definition or even the common conception used by the international outreach
community.
Proving the similarities between World Vision and Compassion International is
critical for two reasons. Beyond being two of the largest FBOs to engage in international
development and sounding almost identical on paper, the actions of both are deeply
impactful. Compassion International is infamous for unabashedly proselytizing in
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developing countries through their child sponsorship programs. World Vision on the
other hand, claims to not proselytize as they receive hundreds of millions of dollars from
the United States Federal Government. For example, in 2016 alone WV received $220
million from the USFG (“Consolidated Financial Statements,” 2016). Due to the lack of
monitoring FBOs and conditional aid, it is important to understand the true intentions and
methods of these groups—especially when some FBOs receive federal funding.
Secondly, it is important to find where the similarities between these
organizations end. Groups that are founded by similar ideologies and use the same
ideographs are not necessarily identical in their conduct. In fact, the “Revised FBO
Typology Table” taken from Bridging the Gaps gives us a way to classify different types
of faith-based organizations in order to understand how World Vision and Compassion
International can vary greatly despite their apparent similarities.

FaithPermeated
Include explicit
references to
faith

FaithCentered
Includes
explicit
references to
faith

FaithAffiliated
Faith
references
may be either
explicit or
implicit

Faith
Background
May have
implicit
references to
faith (e.g.,
references to
values)

Faith-Secular
Partnership
No reference
to faith in
mission of the
partnership or
of the secular
partner

Founded/
organized

By faith group
and/or for faith
purposes

By faith
group and/or
for faith
purposes

By faith
group and/or
for faith
purposes

May have
historic tie to
a faith group
or purpose,
but that
connection is
no longer
strong

Management
/ Leaders

Faith or
ecclesiastical
commitment an

Faith
commitment
understood

Normally
share the
organization’

Faith criteria
considered

Faith partners
founded by
faith group or
for faith
purpose; no
reference to
faith identity
of founders of
the secular
partnerships
may or may
not be
religious
Required to
respect but not
necessarily

Selfdescription
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Secular
No faith
content,
but
references
to values
are often
present
No
reference
to faith
identity or
spiritual
views (if
any) if
founder(s)/
Organizer

Faith
criteria

explicit
prerequisite

to be a
prerequisite
(may be
implicit or
explicit)

Staff/
Volunteers

Faith
commitment is
important; most
or all share
organizations
faith orientation;
faith an explicit
factor in
hiring/recruitmen
t process

Faith
commitment
may be an
explicit
selection
favor for
tasks
involving
religion, but
may be less
important in
other
positions

Financial
and other
support

Garners support
from faith
community

Garners
support from
faith
community

Organized
faith
practices of
personnel/
volunteers
(prayer,
devotions,
etc.)

Faith practices
play a significant
role in the
functioning of the
organization;
personnel/
volunteers
expected or
required to
participate

Main form of
integrating
faith content
with other
program
variables

Integrated/
Mandatory
(engagement
with explicit faith
content is
required of all
beneficiaries)

Faith
practices
play a
significant
role in the
functioning
of the
organization
; personnel/
volunteers
expected or
required to
participate
Integrated/
Optional or
Invitational
(engagement
of
beneficiaries
with explicit
faith content
is optional
or takes
place in
activities
outside

s faith
orientation,
but explicit
faith criteria
are
considered
irrelevant or
improper
Staff/
volunteers are
expected to
respect but
not
necessarily
share the
faith
orientation of
the
organization;
faith beliefs
motivate selfselection of
some staff/
volunteers
Able to
garner some
support from
faith
community

irrelevant or
improper

share faith of
the faith
partners

considered
improper

Little to no
consideratio
n of faith
commitment;
faith beliefs
may
motivate
self-selection
of some
staff/
volunteers

Staff/
volunteers
expected to
respect faith of
the faith
partner(s);
program relies
significantly
on volunteers
from faith
partners

Faith
criteria for
any staff/
volunteer
considered
improper

Able to
garner some
support from
faith
community

Able to garner
some support
from faith
community

Faith
practices are
optional and
not extensive

Faith
practices are
rare and
peripheral to
the
organization

Faith partners
may sponsor
voluntary faith
practices;
secular parties
do not

Little to no
ability to
garner
support
from faith
communit
y
No
organized
faith
practices

Invitational,
Relational or
Implicit
(engagement
of
participants
with explicit
faith content
takes place in
optional
activities
outside the
program
parameters or

Implicit
(beneficiarie
s only
encounter
faith content
if they seek
it out)

Implicit,
Invitational, or
Relational,
depending on
staff/volunteer
s of the faith
partner)

57

None

program
parameters)

Expected
connection
between faith
and
outcomes

Faith
Symbols
Present

Expectation of
explicit faith
experience or
change, and
belief that this is
essential or
significant to
desired outcome

Strong hope
for explicit
faith
experience
or change,
and belief
that this
contributes
significantly
to desired
outcome

Usually

Usually

in informal
relationships
with staff
and/ or
volunteers)
Little
expectation
that faith
change or
activity is
necessary for
desired
outcome,
though it may
be valued for
its own sake;
some believe
that acts of
compassion
and care
alone have an
implicit
spiritual
impact that
contributes to
outcome
Often

No
expectation
that faith
experience
or change is
necessary for
desired
outcome

No expectation
that faith
experience or
change is
necessary for
desired
outcome, but
the faith of
volunteers
from faith
partners is
expected to
add value to
the program

No
expectatio
n of faith
change or
experience

Sometimes

Sometimes
(program’s
administration
usually located
in a secular
environment;
program
activities may
be located in a
faith
environment)

No

(Source: Revised Table drawn from Sider and Unruh (2004); as taken from Bridging
the Gaps by Hefferan, Adkins, and Occhipinti, 2009, pp. 20-25)
As shown above, faith can be integrated in many different capacities and can permeate
the structure through content administered, conduct of the staff, and into the day in and
day out practices. Tamsin Bradley in their 2009 article “A call for clarification and
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critical analysis of the work of faith-based development organizations (FBDO)” defines
“an FBDO to be an organization where faith is embedded into the organizational
structures producing a diversity of approaches to development practice. In some cases,
faith acts as a platform for close partnerships at the community level.” In order to
distinguish which category an NGO falls under, one must determine how influential faith
is within the organization. Depending on that factor, the way an organization measures
success can function on different metrics. For instance, “Faith-Permeated” or “FaithCentered” models will evaluate the success of their outreach depending on whether
participants have an “explicit faith experience of change.” Similarly, to secular NGOs,
those with a faith background (like the Red Cross, Oxfam and Amnesty International)
have no expectation of an individual experiencing a spiritual moment or changing their
faith as a result of receiving their services. Even though all four groups could receive
money to deliver social services or resources, the overarching objective of each vary
greatly from conversions to being satisfied with delivering aid as an end in and of itself.
As explicated in the literature review, one of the most difficult components of
analyzing FBOs is the refusal of these organizations to engage in the terminology and
accurately self-identify. Rather, they prefer to stress their roles as “Christian
development” agencies but not all Christian agencies are equal. The degree faith is
incorporated alters the way they function in theory and in reality. Therefore, it is critical
to understand the nuances betwixt them. Take for example our three case studies.
Compassion Child, a specific program from Compassion International, is a classic
example of a “Faith-Centered” FBO while World Vision more aptly falls under the
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“Faith-Affiliated” category due to the ways they describe themselves. Compassion
international self-identifies as “a Christian child development organization dedicated to
releasing children from poverty” with a focus on benefiting children in their sponsorship
program through “the opportunity to hear the gospel and learn about Jesus; regular
Christian training; . . . a caring and safe Christian environment to grow in self-confidence
and social skills; personal attention, guidance and love” (“Compassion International Our
Mission,” 2018). World Vision specifies “Our goal is for our Christian faith to be woven
through all we do and not as an ‘add on’ to development projects. We never require those
we serve listen to a religious message or convert to Christianity as a condition of aid.”
(“FAQ- About Child Sponsorship,” 2018). By explicitly stating that WV does not apply
conditions to their aid and following through in action, the divide between CI and WV
becomes even more apparent proving not all Christian Development organizations play
by the same rules despite being motivated by the same ideology.
The National Association of Evangelicals differs from WV and CI because it does
not exist primarily as a development agency. The NAE exists to unify churches and
organizations by setting forth a standard on doctrine and service outreach that partners
can ascribe to. Within the NAE there is a humanitarian arm, World Relief, but even more
importantly are the partnerships. Colleges like Wheaton to give Christ-Permeated FBOs
like Samaritan’s Purse down to dozens of smaller churches across the US share the same
Statement of Faith. In addition, they share a similar standard of what “Christian
community development” should look like. Noel Castellanos, CEO of the Christian
Community Development and former appointee to President Obama’s Council for Faith
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and Neighborhood Partnerships, wrote a sponsored post for the NAE addressing the
differences between Christian community development differ and secular community
development.
Community

development

focuses

on

transforming

the

physical

environment of a neighborhood as its primary goal. Christian Community
Development is also committed to that process. However, it begins with the
premise that not only the neighborhood, but also the people that live in it
are important to God and deserve to live in a healthy, flourishing
community. (“National Association of Evangelicals: On Community
Development,” 2016)
The difficulty above is the subtly. By discerning the premise that people in communities
are shown how important they are to God, it indicates that all people need to learn this
view. You can’t learn how important you are to God unless you know who He is. Where
this becomes complicated is realizing that this mission statement by the NAE represents
“more than 45,000 local churches from nearly 40 different denominations, in addition to
nondenominational churches” (“National Associations of Evangelicals: Churches,”
2018). The mission is left vague enough that churches can interpret to what degree they
want to evangelize, based on the one required backing that they evangelize or share the
good news of the Gospel. Recognizing however, that evangelizing is an ideograph to
certain members within the evangelical community this standard can act as the
justification for exploitation for NAE partner organizations like Samaritan’s purse or
small congregations sending missionaries abroad with a lack of experience.
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Without a critical lens one might mistakenly lump together all Christian development
agencies or fall back to large sweeping generalizations that all FBOs are the same. In
reality Oxfam couldn’t be more different than the service trips your local church or
religious school puts together. Clarke stresses the need to define differences as they
“raises caution that not all FBDOs share the vision of culturally sensitive development
practice. Greater critical analysis is needed into the work of FBDOs in order to prevent
funding from being directed towards those FBDOs whose objectives are to proselytize
or/and denigrate other faiths” (2007). This quote once again stresses the importance that
not all FBOs should be defunded or forbidden, but more critical analysis is needed to
ensure funding goes to FBOs whose primary goal is delivering aid instead of
proselytizing.
Ultimately, determining how influential faith is to the structure of an FBO is an
important distinction because it can effect hiring practices, where they get their funds
from, and can fundamentally alter how these groups practice engagement when entering
into the donor/receiver relationship of dispersing aid or social services. FBOs are a
reflection of not only the faiths they represent but the United States. I posit that we
should know how other nations perceive who we are in the world and it is critical to
know exactly what we pay for when the government uses taxpayer dollars to fund FBOs.

Ideographs, Aid, and Identity Creation
The second level of ideographic analysis this chapter covers refers to the practices
Christian FBOs use and how that can fundamentally alter the identity creation,
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intentionally or unintentionally, of themselves and communities they interact with when
they engage in aid. A unique relationship exists between donor and recipient in traditional
development relationships (Probasco, 2016). FBOs uniquely face additional levels of
complexity in this already terse relationship as they transfer material goods as well as
ideology. Examining the language they use during these interactions provides a unique
insight to how the relationship is altered and how it impacts identity creation of both
parties. In the long term, this allows for better assessment of the efficacy and efficiency
of FBOs actions.
Walking into development relationships an inherent imbalance of power exists.
Donors yield a significant advantage to influence situations as they have the ability to
specify where to engage, who can get aid, what conditions (if any) they need to meet, and
what the ultimate goal of the transaction should be. By introducing religion into the
equation, this becomes even messier as “Religion influences the act of giving care to
strangers, from the frequency of volunteering to the amount and objects of charitable
donations to shaping the moral identities of people who give” (Allahyari, 2000; Bekkers
and Wiepking, 2011; Wuthnow, 1991; Probasco, 2016). While I agree with the following
I believe that it also shapes the identities of those who receive the aid. In a study done by
Dr. Erin Probasco in 2009 to 2011 on how Nicaraguans felt receiving aid from secular
versus FBOs. FBOs would refer to their donations as “gifts” to the communities.
Typically, gift exchanges can increase solidarity between parties but only if there is an
ability to reciprocate. Probasco explains that in instances where social and material
inequality exist, like within aid interactions, “the cycle of reciprocity is broken” because

63

those on the receiving end are led to believe that they “can never return gifts that are
equal in material value to those received.” The larger impact is that “‘giver’ and
‘receiver’ become identity markers rather than temporary statuses. In cultures that
practice cyclical gift exchange, an inability to reciprocate signals both economic and
moral inferiority” (Porbasco, 2016, p. 235). In this case study, the after-math of
internalizing these identity markers fostered greater dependence on Western aid and
feelings of hopelessness from the Nicaraguan population to address their own situations.
For example, some Nicaraguans began to pray that they would be worthy to receive the
gifts from “angels” in the West adding a literal nuance to the “white savior” argument. As
Probasco explains,
Divine agency becomes the prime mover in initiating and accomplishing
specific aid exchanges that are identified in advance as desirable by
recipients. In these accounts, foreign volunteers were not careful observers
of poverty who identified needs. Instead, they were the messengers or
delivery system of divine will. (Probasco, 2016, p. 241)
Western FBOs acting as “messengers . . . of divine will” do not refer to themselves as
angels or explicitly encourage dependence on their aid. In fact, often times FBOs want to
create empowerment in the communities they engage with by encouraging selfsufficiency. However, due to the intermingling of “divine will” with the volatile relation
between donor and recipient, these roles can be internalized. Typically, “when donor and
recipient goals clash, common wisdom and experience suggest that recipients will adapt
to donor requirements” (Probasco, 2016, p. 232; Bradley, 2009) meaning that recipients
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will also adopt the rhetoric of these organizations in order engage with these
requirements. By sharing language and rituals like prayer, it bonds the groups together.
However, it also creates buy-in to the narrative presented by FBO to communities in
developing countries when both groups use the same language for meaning making and
describing their identity. This case study is critical to illustrate that group identity can be
unintentionally constituted as a result of interacting with another collective identity when
engaging in delicate relationships like the transference of international aid and religious
ideology.
Beyond adopting the rhetoric and internalizing identity markers, recipient
communities may also cater to what they perceive the “requirements of donors” to be
(Bradley, 2008). One of the most heart-breaking examples is the commodification and
objectification of Cambodian orphans. Cambodia, like other nations in Southeast Asia,
Africa, and Latin America, experience high volumes of “voluntourism.” Meaning tourists
would come to Cambodia and volunteer either in addition to their vacations or create
vacation around this experience. During their visits to Cambodia tourists would pour in
donations and support local businesses. Typically, foreigners visiting a developing
country is beneficial as it stimulates the local economy. The tourist may come
individually or with a group like a service trip or mission trip. Regardless of the number,
“voluntourists” typically come with open pocket books and the best of intentions (Rotabi
et. al, 2017). The problem then became the volume of “voluntourists” unintentionally
created a market for the problem they were attempting to solve: the abuse of Cambodian
orphans.
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According to Juliana Ruhfus’ article “Cambodia’s Orphan Business” published in
2012 by Aljazeera, this influx in tourism centered around working in orphanages created
incentive for Cambodians to cater to the newly created market by maintaining
appearances of “poverty porn” and ensuring that orphanages stay open. Ruhfus explicates
“despite a period of prosperity in the country, the number of children in orphanages has
more than doubled in the past decade, and over 70 per cent of the estimated 10,000
'orphans' have at least one living parent” (Ruhfus, 2012). Parents in Cambodia would
choose to send their children to orphanages because it was financially lucrative for them
to do so as Westerners would pour donations in. What’s worse, in order to maintain this
industry Cambodian orphanages and communities would often purposefully attempt to
continue underdevelopment to cater to this “poverty porn” standard the “voluntourism”
industry implicitly demanded. This resulted in the very real exploitation of children in
these orphanages as failing orphanages would be kept open to draw in Westerners and the
money they received did not go to the children but to those running these orphanage
industries.
Additionally, there have been allegations of abuse by Westerners but even more
commonly are the psychological damage done to these children who face constant cycles
of abandonment. When volunteers are at the orphanage for week long spans they give
affection to the children and leave soon after. Children get emotionally connected to
individuals or are threatened to appear happy in order to continue receiving donations.
One such story is of Yan Chanty and Kong Thy who became homeless after their Frenchfunded organization shut down due to embezzlement on the part of the director. Ruhfus
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writes, “Both young men are deeply traumatized by their removal from their parents and
life in the orphanage. Yet, Chanty and Kong are the survivors. They tell us how half of
the orphanages' former inhabitants are now homeless and living on the streets, while
many have mental problems and some have even died” (Ruhfus, 2012).
This case study, while tragic, illustrates that recipients respond to donor demands.
These demands are not always explicitly articulated by donors, often they are portrayed
through the creation of markets like the one for voluntourism. Within the context of
FBOs this is important because 1) FBOs send large volumes of groups to do outreach to
these groups fueling these industries and 2) FBOs may not realize the implicit or
perceived donor demands they create. If FBOs claim that they are merely “encouraging”
those they deliver aid and social services to accept Christianity, there are undertones of
pressure for individuals experiencing extreme duress to adapt these views, rhetoric, and
customs in order to continue receiving services.
Thus far, I have shown you the identity construction that occurs as a result of the
relationship between donors and recipients and how the rhetoric used by both groups can
act to bridge cultural divides as well as to constrain individuals to new cycles of
dependency; the different structures of NGOs and FBOs fundamentally alter the practices
and objectives of development agencies. Now I will examine how FBOs employ
ideographs to justify their practices and the implications of doing so.
The most popular ideographs for FBOs are their propensity to reference
“evangelizing” and “witnessing” in place of proselytism. To outsiders, “witnessing”
would simply mean the act of listening to or testifying about their faith and
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“evangelizing” means to spread the good news of the Gospel. In reality, the tactics of
“witnessing” and “evangelizing” do more than to simply encourage or watch passively.
They are descriptors for any tactics that an FBO utilizes in their outreach. Using
platforms like soup kitchens, delivering emergency aid after natural disasters, or handing
out diapers in at-risk neighborhoods to needy mothers would all provide opportunities for
FBOs to “witness” or “evangelize” spreading their ideology to those who accept these
donations. Some FBOs will even refuse to deliver these goods and services until after
they have had an opportunity to engage in outreach, creating conditionality to their
aid. However, more often than not FBOs claim they do not coercively attempt to force
participants to take on their ideology. However, as I have previously shown, the very
nature of the aid-based relationships are complicated and can add an edge of compulsion
FBO donors may not realize are there.
So what would coercive conversion look like? The international community
would typically refer to this process as proselytism. Proselytism typically refers to “enddirected efforts to spread faith through conversion” (Fletcher, 2014, p. 67; Stanhke, 1999,
p. 255-6) or more critically, “defined as actively promoting conversion to a particular
ideology or religion or otherwise pressuring potential converts to accord with specific
norms and practices” (Lynch and Schwartz, 2016, p. 60). While proselytism is typically
frowned upon by FBOs and the international community (Fletcher, p. 68) the lack of
binding legal definition means that proselytism conduct is still hotly debated among FBO
members and participants. However, witnessing and evangelizing fall outside this
scrutiny as those out of the community do not recognize the extra meaning embedded
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into these seemingly plain language terms—rather they seem innocuous. Moreover,
witnessing and evangelizing are also defined through subjective means depending on the
individual or individual organizations utilizing that rhetoric. The lack of clear legal
definitions around all three of these buzzwords have resulted in stigma around the word
“proselytism” with some nations banning missionaries entering into their country on the
basis of proselytism while turning a blind eye to evangelizing and witnessing. Ultimately,
using phrases like evangelizing and witnessing effectively act as a de facto form of
proselytism on a massive scale (Fletcher, 2014, p. 68). I believe that witnessing and
evangelizing are ideographs because to those who identify with the Religious Right, and
specifically evangelicals, these words represent their ideological obligation to follow The
Great Commission of Jesus. Subsequently, these words are revered as part of their
identity and as a transition between ideology to group action. There is clearly meaning
embedded into these terms that outsiders would not recognize and the force of these
ideographs manifest as the action component to collective identity. Through the
examination of the practices FBOs utilize when witnessing and evangelizing, it is evident
that proselytism is repeated almost exactly in international aid and development yet
undetected due to this rhetorical phenomenon in which members who know these
ideographs will feel justified in their actions without seeing how coercive their actions
truly are.
Since these practices are hidden in plain sight as ideographs, the best way to
determine what “witnessing” and evangelizing” manifest as are to examine how FBOs
use them in their literature. McGee tells us that ideographs are conveyed through
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“Ideology [as] a political language composed of slogan like terms signifying collective
commitment” (McGee, 1980, p. 435). One report by Dr. Kaoma with the organization
Political Research Associates researched evangelical FBO presence in sub-Saharan
Africa in 2009 found that evangelicals use “‘Social witness’ [as] a term describing how
churches respond to God’s call to work for peace and justice” (2009, p. 2). This definition
is mirrored in literature published by World Vision, “As we help children and families
gain access to life essentials – like clean water, nutritious food, and healthcare – we strive
to serve as a vibrant witness throughout our lives, deeds, and words to God’s
unconditional love for all people in the hope available in Christ” (“World Vision:
Christian Faith,” 2018). Serving as a “witness” in this context goes beyond the assumed
quiet observation those outside the community might expect. Instead, it indicates
“collective commitment” to proclaiming “God’s unconditional love for all people” while
delivering life essentials. To build on this and tie directly to McGee, “bearing witness” is
a slogan like term that binds collectives and drives them to act, “We believe that bearing
witness to Christ is every Christian’s responsibility. We demonstrate our faith in various
ways—by who we are and how we live, the words we use to express our faith and
pointing to God’s work (i.e., life, deed, word and sign).” The emphasis being, there is
nothing passive about witnessing.
NAE sponsored organizations like Samaritan’s Purse prefer to use “evangelizing”
in lieu of “witnessing” in their literature but functionally they serve the same purpose.
Franklin Graham, founder of Samaritan’s Purse shares the NAE Statement of Faith to
evangelize across the globe. Samaritan’s Purse has become one of the world largest FBOs
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and it holds tight to its spiritual backing, even at times to the detriment of the individuals
receiving the organization’s assistance. For example, Samaritan’s Purse was awarded
$830,000 by USAID to create a medical center in Lubango, Angola (Marsden, 2012;
Stockman et al., 2006). Graham created the Evangelical Medical Center and required that
staff must be evangelical (and even used this reasoning to justify hiring discrimination
when refusing to employ Catholics). The most important tenant is that nurses were
expected to evangelize on the job. This mirrored former requirements Graham had put
out to employees distributing aid like in 2001 when Samaritan’s Purse refused to provide
instruction for earthquake victims to set up USAID funded shelters until after evangelistic
services. Upon the dedication of the Evangelical Medical Center, Graham “claims to have
led 13,496 souls to Jesus” (Stockman et al., 2006). Clearly, evangelizing as Graham has
employed in El Salvador, Angola and most recently in Haiti after the 2014 hurricane,
means “end-directed efforts to spread faith through conversion” (Fletcher, 2014, p. 67;
Stanhke, 1999, pp. 255-6). By smuggling in a false agenda using ideographs, Graham has
been able to skirt federal regulation and invest millions of tax payer dollars into his
proselytizing agenda. The largest current controversy Graham’s FBO is facing is
accusations of proselytism in India as Operation Christmas Child care packages continue
to flood in the country offering toys for children, hygiene products, and Bibles. Some
may believe that this seems relatively harmless, however, Franklin Graham’s intentions
have been abundantly clear as he has been quoted saying he targets India to receive aid
because of the "hundreds of millions of people locked in the darkness of Hinduism . . .
bound by Satan's power" (Subramanya, 2015). Clearly, the objectives of Franklin’s FBO
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are for conversions and he, like other NEA affiliated partners, use the deliverance of aid
and social services (like education and health care) as a platform to force engagement.
Proselytism is one of the largest harms that FBOs continually partake in and it is
constantly evolving. Under the guise of “witnessing” and “evangelizing” FBO can
receive government funding to deliver aid and apply conditions, implicitly like in the case
of Cambodia and Nicaragua, and explicitly as indicated by Samaritan’s Purse in Angola,
Haiti, El Salvador and India. Due to the ideographic nature of “witnessing” and
“evangelizing” proselytism has increased while governments can claim plausible
deniability in their awareness. However, it could not be more clear to those within FBOs,
and those interacting with them, the reality of the situation. This is not only unethical but
it is frightening to see proselytism evolve from one missionary waving a loaf of bread in
front of a starving child with one hand while holding a Bible in the other, to a savvy
state-sponsored enterprise in which aid or development resources (spanning from
microloans to medical care) are held on the condition of conforming to religious rhetoric.

Proselytism Undermines Development and Dignity
The practices FBOs engage in can ultimately undermine the overarching goals of
“empowerment” and “development” that the United States and the United Nations are
devoted to. More importantly, when groups engage in practices that negatively impact the
groups they are attempting to help (as evidenced through case studies like Nicaragua,
Cambodia, Haiti, India, and El Salvador) it calls into question the role of these groups.
For the sake of FBOs and the groups they are attempting to help it is crucial to reevaluate
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implicit and explicit demands that are altering the donor/recipient relationship as well as
the subsequent identity construction of these groups. Finally, proselytism should be
avoided at all costs and ideographs that have created de facto proselytism should be
heavily scrutinized. As Mahatma Gandhi so eloquently articulated, "I hold that
proselytizing under the cloak of humanitarian work, is to say the least, unhealthy. It is
most certainly resented by the people here" (Subramanya, 2015). Recognizing local
populations resent proselytizing practices, when an FBO chooses to utilize these practices
it ultimately undermines the objectives of the sponsoring organization and even more
importantly, it is un-dignifying to coerce individuals into adopting religious practices
during times of extreme duress in their life.
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Chapter Five: The Rise of FBOs and the Religious Right
Within the last ten years, as invocations of God or reference to faith by government
officials set modern era highs, three out of four Americans report identifying as
Christians (Domke & Coe, 2010). Unsurprisingly, the rise of American Christian FBOs
in international development and aid did not occur spontaneously. Rather, their increased
influence occurred as a direct result of the Religious Right’s careful creation to carve out
a space for themselves as a prominent and un-ignorable force in United States politics. In
this chapter I will walk through the rise of the Religious Right and the implications on
domestic and foreign policy.
This chapter covers the insemination of the Religious Right as a voting bloc in the
United States. By tracing their mythic reality back to its inception, I unearth the social
implications of constitutive rhetoric in mobilizing political action on domestic and
international scales. Further, I will deconstruct “stewardship” as a lynchpin that holds this
myth of FBOs being more effective in disseminating aid. This myth is what allowed for
the Religious Right to steer foreign policy to get involved in Sudan, the AIDS fight in
Africa, and many issues of development.

The Rise of the Religious Right in Politics
Defining the Religious Right is the first step in understanding the vast impact they
have had on shifting the American political climate in the last fifty years. According to
Dr. Lee Marsden, an expert from East Anglia University who specializes in researching
the Christian Right and their impacts on U.S. foreign policy, there are a multitude of
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terms that can be used to describe this collective identity such as the “‘Religious Right,’
‘born-again Christians,’ ‘conservative evangelicals,’ ‘religious conservatives,’ and
‘dominionists’ (Marsden, 2008, p. 3). Alternatively, Clyde Wilcox defines the Christian
Right as “a social movement that attempts to mobilize evangelical Protestants and other
orthodox Christians into conservative political action” (Marsden, 2008, p. 3). Due to the
nebulous nature of defining the Christian Right, it can be difficult to quantify their
numbers. For instance, pollsters and statisticians have difficulty conducting research in
estimating or predicating their future decision making.
Marsden explains that it is difficult to define the Religious Right as a movement
because it appears to exist as a phenomenon. I would argue that though Marsden is
correct that defining the Religious Right as a movement and predicating their subsequent
actions is difficult, it would be a fundamental misstep to classify the Religious Right as a
phenomenon. Rather, I agree with McGee who states that collective identities (e.g. “the
people”) “are more process than phenomenon” (McGee, 1975, p. 240). Meaning that this
group did not arise from thin air nor will it remain in its constant state. “The People” are
alive and constantly evolving through their use of narrative construction, ritual creation,
and contributing to shared meaning making. The Christian Right is the perfect example of
the process it takes to constitute identity and to illustrate the evolutions a group will
undergo throughout this process.
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Historical Context of the Religious Right
President Jimmy Carter began incorporating his Southern Baptist Christian identity
into his presidential rhetoric in the late 1970s. Drawing on his experiences as a Sunday
school teacher, he was able to connect with fellow Christian voters by broadcasting that
narrative in interviews, presidential debates, and public addresses. However, it wasn’t
until a strategic decision made by top Republicans during President Ronald Reagan’s
campaign that the official courtship of the Religious Right began. In the 1980 presidential
election Reagan faced off against presidential incumbent Jimmy Carter. Republicans, in
need of votes and resolved to win the executive office, shifted the conservative platform
to focus on “family values” in order to court a much needed and previously untapped
voting block: religious voters. In doing so, Republicans inadvertently created a new
Christian political identity: the Religious Right. By the very nature of creating this
political platform Republicans were able to dictate what “family values” and “Christian
issues” entailed in politics. Capitalizing on controversial issues of the day they catered
their platform to highlight issues they felt 1) would draw in protestants (like evangelicals)
and 2) could benefit the goals of their party. The fight against abortion became a main
issue, upholding religious freedom a close second, followed by “traditional” marriage or
“family values” which manifested through anti-LGBTQ policies like opposing same-sex
marriage as well as shaming promiscuity, and finally focusing on individual
responsibility to emphasize their opposition to big government. The creation of this
platform is magnificently unique insofar as it reached out to an identity that was already
constituted and it assigned political action to the group in order to serve the organizer’s
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agenda. Over time, the explicit instruction that Reagan did to form this narrative (e.g. the
“Christians for Reagan” campaign) eventually began to evolve into more subtle
references by the time Obama came to power (Coe and Chennoweth, 2015, p. 281).
To this day, the simplest way to identify the Religious Right is by the policies they
support, not by their titles. As evidence Marsden claims that “the Christian Right are
politically active conservatives, united in their opposition to abortion, euthanasia, stemcell research, homosexuality, same-sex marriage, promiscuity, secularism and big
government” (2008, pg. 4). The National Association of Evangelicals cite their purpose
as “provid[ing] a forum where Evangelicals can work together to preserve religious
liberty, nurture families and children, protect the sanctity of human life, seek justice for
the poor, promote human right, work for peace, and care for God’s creation” (“National
Association of Evangelicals: Mission and Work,” 2018). The overlap between Christian
values today and the Republican agenda from the 1980s has infiltrated an identity so
deeply that the group not only uses these points to identify its purpose, but evangelicals
do not remember this transition. The National Association of Evangelicals claims that
only “theological convictions define us––not political, social or cultural trends”
(“National Association of Evangelicals: What is an Evangelical?,” 2018). The deep irony
being that evangelicals are one of the most powerful voting blocs in the United States
today (largely credited as securing President Trump’s presidency) and the NAE
articulates the church’s opinion on current issues. For all intents and purposes, they are
constantly adding to the identity of “evangelical” by requiring political action from their
actors but refusing to recognize the conscious efforts that have and are being used to
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construct their narrative. McGee describes these political myths as “endemic to the
human condition and, though technically they represent nothing but a “false
consciousness,” they nonetheless function as a means of providing social unity and
collective identity. Indeed, “the people” are the social and political myths they accept”
(McGee, 1975, p. 247). The religious right, “the people” I am examining, are responding
to social and political myths and are bonding through those myths. They then go on to
continue evolving the myth to expand the fiction to fit their perception of the world.
Using these “social and political myths” to filter facts and create a new reality, groups
can rewrite, erase or invent a history and facticity of their choosing.
Of equal relevance, beyond recrafting the narrative for one group, Coa and
Chennoweth report that many Americans are conditioned through the political discourse
of Christian leaders “to connect the country’s ‘moral prestige’ with Christian values”
(2015, p. 281). These very values, once again, being largely constructed by career
politicians to secure votes, not deriving explicitly from doctrine like the Christian Right
would advocate.

Rise of FBOs through the CFBCI
Since the 1990s, social policy has elevated the status of FBOs to “supplement or
replace government in addressing social problems” (De Vita, 1999; Marwell, 2004;
Smith & Sosin, 2001; Vanderwoerd, 2008). In the 1996 welfare reform, the “Charitable
Choice” legislation included in the 1996 welfare reform would pave the road to allowing
the government to increase access of FBO to apply for state funding while loosening
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constraints on these organizations to include faith tenants in their outreach. These
legislative changes set the field for the creation of the White House Office for FaithBased and Community Initiatives.

The largest consolidation of power for the Religious Right occurred during
President George W. Bush’s first term. George W. Bush introduced the world to
“compassionate conservatism” where he highlighted his Christian faith as a candidate and
used it as justification for supporting conservative policies or using prayer as a means of
appeasing religious constituents who were not happy about his policy decisions. In many
ways, this acted as an evolution of the Religious Right narrative but was much more
subtle than Reagan’s explicit appeal to Christians. In response to wanting to cater to his
constituents, fortifying compassionate conservatism and pressure to cut down on
government spending for welfare, the Bush administration crafted a plan to outsource
social services. In late 2001, Bush created the Center for Faith-Based and Community
(CFBCI) Initiatives within the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) (Huliaras, 2008). The CFBCI acted as the main point of contact between
USAID and the faith communities by reaching out to FBOs to instruct them how to apply
for government funding to develop social services domestically and internationally at
organized church meetings across the country. Lack of experience or expertise in the field
would not jeopardize FBOs’ opportunity to receive funding, rather funding to FBOs
doubled and all State Department offices were told to encourage FBOs to assist in
delivery of social services (Huliaras, 2008; Marsden, 2008).
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The CFBCI quickly brought about several problems. First, many worried the
separation between church and state was being degraded. Though there were officially
rules in place to prohibit proselytism, individuals found ways to skirt around those rules
with Bush himself even being quoted on the record saying to a group of religious leaders
about FBOs in 2004, “I think if you ask them their biggest problem, they'd say, ‘Well, we
need to expand, there's more souls to be saved, we need a little extra space for our rescue
mission,’ he said. He then assured the groups: ‘The government has got resources’”
(Stockman et al., 2006). Founder of Samaritan’s Purse, Franklin Graham parroted these
sentiments in a later interview after controversies surrounding his proselytism in Sudan
and Angola saying, “Of course you cannot proselytize with tax dollars, and rightfully so.
I agree with that. But it doesn't mean that we can't build buildings, we cannot provide
housing and buy bricks and mortar. The proselytizing or the preaching or the giving out
of Bibles, people give us funds for those” (Stockman et al., 2006). Technically, this
loophole is permissible because many FBOs combine government funding with private
donation. The most common example being the millions USAID has allocated for FBOs
to build religious medical centers and to buy medical equipment in developing countries.
Despite, evangelizing while administering care, FBOs like Samaritan’s Purse can claim
that handing out Bibles and missionaries do not come from the government’s so they are
free to engage in the activity they want by reallocating what money (state or private) they
use to sponsor their various activities. The true reason that so many have been able to get
away with proselytism on the government’s dime is because the CFBCI lacks an
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enforcement mechanism. Additionally, USAID does not monitor proselytism (Stockman
et al., 2006; Marsden, 2008)
Another problem that arose from the creation of this office has been fund
allocation. An expose by the Boston Globe in 2006 found that “98 percent of funds went
to Christian Organizations” (Stockman et al., 2006). There was a clearly bias in favor of
Bush’s constituents and little has been done to address this to this day. The ethical
question of whether Bush could sequester millions to woo his voters remain
controversial. Bush claimed no bias factored into his decision. Instead he justified the
creation and existence of the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives because he
believed that “the best, most efficient purveyors of social services were faith-based
organizations, since they often worked with low overhead and volunteer labor”
(Hefferan, Adkins & Occhipian, 2009, p. 6). The image that FBOs are still altruistic and
adhere to a strict moral discipline continues to bolster the narrative that allows FBOs to
continue receiving hundreds of millions annually from USAID (Bradley, 2009). In many
ways, the perception of FBO effectiveness as an ideal distributor of aid is an offshoot
from the mythic reality created by the Religious Right. While volunteering does occur
within these organizations it does not create for better services. In fact because the
overhead is so low, and FBOs and NGOs alike will strive to keep it low, it means that
FBOs will not hire an administrator to keep up with the outcomes (or unintended
consequences) of dispersing aid to assess the impacts of the organizations involvement in
international aid and development. In many ways, the creation of the CFBCI was a deal
with the devil. Bush got to seal the religious bloc for Republicans, claimed to lower
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welfare and development costs by outsourcing social service to FBOs and in exchange
governments would look the other way when funds were used to degrade the separation
between church and state through proselytism, and conveniently ignore the shocking lack
of accountability and assessment for FBOs once they had the money. At the end of the
day, the CFBCI solidified a place of power for the Religious Right as they could apply
for grant money from USAID to go overseas or to stay home with little to no monitoring
or supervision. This is essentially the equivalent of writing a blank check to an agency
and saying you solved for US hegemonic soft power overseas but being too afraid to
check your bank account to see what that exchange ended up costing you.

The Myth of Stewardship
Based upon the complex mythic reality composed by decades of politicians
consolidating with religious leaders, it became apparent that certain standards would need
to be met in a quid pro quo exchange between the church and state. The government
would allow more leniency to FBOs on the condition that they could bolster the mythic
reality of better spending. As a result, the ideograph of stewardship bridged an
understanding between the groups. To an outsider, stewardship would mean to mind
resources (typically in an agricultural sense). However, the state used stewardship as a
coded word for a big government alternative who would be fiscally responsible.
Conversely, FBOs would use it as managing resources in a way that honored their donors
wishes. When government officials would read it, they would see their needs being met,
but unbeknownst to them, stewardship is also used as an ideograph within the religious
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communities to indicate their ability to use their resources to meet their desired outcomes.
In the last chapter, I showed the necessity to understand the practices and objectives of
various structures of FBOs. This chapter will expand into how FBOs indicate to their
community that faith and pragmatic objectives have been met. By looking at examples of
stewardship employed in World Vision’s and Compassion International’s fiscal reports
and fundraising material it will become evident how ideographs can be equivocated as
logic.
Some faith-based organizations have a unique advantage of drawing upon an
immense pool of private donations from their supporters and congregations while also
drawing upon immense amount of government funds. Recognizing this, these FBOs also
face a unique challenge: the ability to appease two very different donors to ensure their
money is being spent properly in order to ask for more donations from each in the future.
FBOs have been able to navigate this tension in two distinct ways: first, by catering the
content to an organization you know will exclusively deal with. For example, if World
Vision writes a grant to USAID requesting funding to build a school in rural Kenya, they
would minimize the language about faith components and write specifically about how
they will accomplish USAID’s objectives of international development and do it a
cheaper price because they have other sources of funding to draw from. For USAID, it
would be an obvious thing to sponsor since they bid at the cheapest price and it will
accomplish what USAID could not do on its own. On the other hand, if World Vision
was crafting a pitch for a closed-door room of religious leaders then the pitch would
encompass the importance of education as critical to holistic development. They may
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mention the spiritual implications of children being able to read their own Bible, or that
the lessons this school will teach will incorporate Biblical teaching. The trick then
becomes how FBOs navigate the tension of publishing materials both groups will see and
interact with. The answer, is by coding certain phrases to speak to each group without the
other realizing. For example, when we examine Compassion International and World
Vision’s CFOs’ fiscal reports for 2016 similar sentiments arise. World Vision claims to
be “committed to the highest standards of financial stewardship.” While Compassion
International reaffirms their value of stewardship, “our commitment to stewardship has
not changed.” In laymen’s terms, both of these phrases would be the equivalent of saying,
“We are investing your money wisely.” Now the shift for “stewardship” as an ideograph
occurs through the recognition that wise investments would vary greatly depending on
the donor reading it.
McGee explains that in order to determine the content of an ideograph we must
examine the ideological building blocks surrounding it based on the content that
surrounds it. In this instance, by tracing donation links through these websites it is
possible to find the true objectives of the organization and the true meaning of
stewardship as an ideograph. Often times, it takes time to trace through links to unearth
what the organization is really trying to convey to Christian audiences. For instance,
Compassion International does not receive any government funding so their fundraising
tactics are much more transparent as to their objectives. As potential donors navigate
through the side they are met with Bible verses with hyperlinks to the donation page on
topics ranging from generosity, the Lord’s call to help those in need, and on broader
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subjects like children. If you navigate to those donation pages, you are met with promises
of “stewardship” and financial certification on the bottom of donation pages reassuring
you of best business practices. Digging deeper, unearths what your donation will be put
toward if you decide to invest in healthcare, education, or sponsorship. Compassion
International lists one specific benefit a child will receive when sponsored is “the
opportunity to hear the gospel and learn about Jesus; regular Christian training . . . a
caring and safe Christian environment to grow in self-confidence and social skills;
personal attention, guidance and love.” Further down the fundraising rabbit hole on their
fundraising page, below their promises for stewardship, they cite research findings which
surveyed former sponsored children and asked which component of Compassion’s
program was most beneficial to them, the most common answer was “educational
support” (38.5%). The second most common response related to “spiritual development”
(29.4%). Listing both of these are immensely telling about Compassion International’s
true objectives. They aim to grow students spiritually and through education. These
objectives are not inherently wrong, but it is important to realize where the organization
truly stands so when claims of “Outstanding stewardship is more than a priority at
Compassion. It’s a deeply held value.” Donors can understand where their money will go.
Stewardship for World Vision has a stronger ideographic link as they code their
content catering to two separate audiences, private donors and the government. The
complexity that comes with stewardship here is not the definition they give, they are
rather upfront about what they believe stewardship to mean “The resources at our
disposal are not our own. They are a trust from God through donors on behalf of the poor.
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We speak and act honestly. We are open and factual in our dealings with donors, project
communities, governments and the public at large,” (“WV: We are Good Stewards,
2017). The complexity derives from the results they list to evidence this claim. For
instance, “3,494,939 children and youth participation in discipleship and values
education” (“World Vision: Christian Faith,” 2018) and on their sponsorship page “Your
monthly gift will help ensure that World Vision serves as a beacon light of God’s love,
touching the lives of children and families all over the globe” (“World Vision: Ways to
Give to Christian Faith,” 2018). Linking the outcome of their success in regard to an
ideograph to two additional ideographs creates this complexity. Specifically, Cloud
writes extensively on the empty term that is “values education.” Groups choose what
values to teach to these children. In the next chapter, we will explore the implications of
teaching millions of children across the globe “family values.” Further, WV links into yet
another ideograph by tying your donation to the “beacon light” ideograph. This ideograph
is commonly seen as a visual ideograph and refers to spreading, witnessing, and
evangelizing across the globe.
Ultimately, stewardship for World Vision and Compassion International go beyond
the simple dictionary definition of minding resources and beyond secular conceptions of
accountability. In reality, stewardship acts as a signifier to different communities that
their goals are being prioritized in met depending on the reader. When these goals entail
“evangelizing” and “witnessing” than the signals that politicians, governments, and
various granting agencies are being blinded from the reality of how their money will be
spent. Much to the government’s chagrin, accountability has little to do with FBOs’
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continued usage of “stewardship.” This has been proven in 2006 when the US
Government Accountability Office sampled a small pool of 13 federally financed FBOs,
4 of which did “not appear to understand the requirements to separate these activities
[evangelizing and delivering state sponsored assistance] in time or location from their
program services” (Huliaras, 2008, p. 166).
The significance of stewardship derives less from revealing a particularly complicated
meaning in the ideograph but rather how necessary to support the mythic reality of the
Religious Right in the United States. This ideograph is fundamental to the narrative that
FBOs are justified having a place in the US government. Realizing that the justification is
entirely factious calls into question the major impacts that the Religious Right has been
able to enact as a result of using these groups and this office to get closer to policy
makers and presidents.

Becoming a Prominent Player in US Foreign Policy
Through close government connections founded on mythic realities like Bush’s
“compassionate conservatism,” FBOs began gaining power to determine where and how
foreign aid was being delivered.
While FBOs were encouraged to apply for USAID money, secular organizations
began to struggle. For agencies like CARE, UN Population Fund, Reproductive Health
for Refugee Consortium, Marie Stopes, and Advocates for Youth have also seen their
government funding decline by millions over the years as the award to Christian groups
increase (Marsden, 2008, p. 135; Kaplan, 2005; Stockman et al., 2006). Marsden
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theorizes this is “based on political considerations rather than ability or expertise in
delivering services” (2008, p. 126) and as a direct result of these secular agencies losing
funding, it increases the likelihood of secular NGOs having to leaving due to the
constraint in resources. In order to fill the void left behind by the absence of these secular
social service providers, FBOs (both government sponsored and those willing to
fundraise independently) would take the place of secular NGOs giving FBOs the
opportunity to carry their moral agenda into their aid work in greater concentrations.
This process occurs twofold as FBOs that receive no government funding (e.g.
money from USAID) can draw on their congregation and own donor pools in order to
independently raise funds for any development or aid project they choose to pursue
domestically or internationally. Without government funding, these FBOs can engage in
any outreach or ministry they see fit without the pretense of avoiding proselytizing,
witnessing or evangelizing since they aren’t bound to USFG standards or any punitive
measures. Secular NGOs do not traditionally have as large donor pools to draw from nor
can they draw on them with such consistency. Meaning that when government money is
earmarked, or given special preference to FBOs, then secular NGOs are more likely to
disappear from at-risk areas altogether if they lose large portions of their funds from their
largest backer. FBOs on the other hand can more readily make up the difference of
government money lost by relying predominantly on individual donations to cover
materials they wish to distribute, building costs, etc. In a self-fulfilling cycle, NGOs are
then able to bid partial costs for projects since they know they can raise the remainder
(and at times prefer this so they can justify proselytizing using private money). In
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comparison, secular NGOs or state sponsored aid will have to petition for higher costs
since they do not have as large a donor pool to draw from. When they do not secure the
majority of funds, or if they lose said funds, they are more likely to leave. Subsequently,
when these NGOs leave there is a dire “need” to aid these communities who find
themselves strapped for resources. This “need” can then be used as a pitch by FBOs in
their own fundraising (to proposition the government or to fill up collection plates on
Sunday) to fill those gaps. The trajectory of prioritizing government money for FBOs
means secular NGOs are more likely to leave and the presence of more FBOs that are
partially government funded and independently funded take their place.
The CFBCI and fundraising techniques described have resulted in the creation of
a “pay to play system” where essentially if organizations are able to raise money either
partially or fully then they can independently decide what to do with the funds. If an
organization like Compassion Child, which is fully independently funded, wants to
proselytize there is technically no law to stop them (unless a country has enacted that on
their own terms). However, ethically it violates the Red Cross Code of Conduct as well as
reflects poorly on the institution which is why most organizations will use proselytizing
practices under the guise of “witnessing” and “evangelizing.” The tie in to government
funding is what makes the “pay to play” system so convoluted. Because a secular
organization, Planned Parenthood, is barred from applying to government aid because
they offer abortion as an option in their guidance on reproductive health (Marsden, 2008,
p. 125). Being denied USAID funding because their ideology does not align with the
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current administration seems discriminatory at best and a dangerous abuse of power at
worst.
Conversely, Planned Parenthood can fundraise independently they could also join
the “pay to play” system and choose where they wanted to deliver aid, how they wanted
to do it, etc., but due to the differences in fundraising this is not viable. I argue this offers
an illusion of equality, as proven and experienced healthcare administrators are
systematically kept from delivering state sponsored social services and FBOs, who lack
experience, accountability, and struggle separating transferring ideology with aid, have a
unique leg up in the system.
Yet another component of this pay to play system means that more relationships
are forged between government officials and FBOs. These close-knit relationships
resulted in several key foreign policy decisions. For example, Christian FBOs like the
FRC, Persecution Project Foundation, International Christian Concern, Christian
Freedom International, and Voice of Martyrs, etc. to name a few (Marsden, 2008, p. 135)
successfully lobbied Congress and the White House to intervene in the Sudanese conflict.
This represented a turning point in the power of the Christian Right, now they were no
longer only being wooed by the Republican party, they were honing their influence in
Washington to drive foreign policy agendas.
Sudan was a unique battle ground. It represented the first time the Religious Right
was able to successfully shift US foreign policy agenda to fit their objectives. The
Religious Right were able to mobilize in record numbers to convince the Bush
administration to get involved in the Sudanese conflicts. Not only is this demonstrative of
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what constitutive identity can do when the people and government officials buy into the
same values and reality, but it shows the power of individuals fighting to preserve a
threatened narrative. As it turned out, engaging in Sudan actually helped to strengthen the
narrative of Christians fighting the “good fight” group. The Sudanese conflict was
portrayed as a righteous struggle between Christians in the south and Muslims in the
north. Due to the emphasis on two foundational mythic realities the evangelical church
relied upon for their narrative, Sudan was able to create the lifeblood to the movement.
First, the mythic reality of the living body of Christ. Secondly, that of the persecuted
church. The Bible commonly references the persecution of those who believe in Jesus as
a sign of validity for their beliefs (for example, 2 Timothy 3:12, “Indeed, all who desire
to live a godly life in Christ Jesus will be persecuted,” and John 15:18, “If the world hates
you, know that it has hated me before it hated you.”) In order to prove this narrative,
Christians within the United States would show images of Sudanese Christians being
targeted. By illustrating that Christians are still persecuted overseas, it not only fulfills
this narrative but it illustrates to Christians within the United States that their very
identity as the collective of “the body of Christ” was under attack.
After successful intervention in Sudan, the Religious Right grew empowered.
FBO had changed the rules of the game when it comes to United States foreign policy.
They mobilized to dictate where and how and development was delivered. Africa became
the newest battle ground as the Christian Right were ultimately the ones to convince the
Bush Administration to invest $15 billion to fight HIV/AIDS (a request he had ignored
from secular humanitarian organizations for year) (Marsden, 2008, p. 249).
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Controversially, one third of that money was to be reserved for promotion of abstinence
only prevention initiative. Also known as the ABC approach (abstinence; be faithful; and
use condoms as a last resort for couples where one partner was infected) (Green, 2003, p.
6; Marsden, 2008, p. 6). The Christian Right also succeed in banning needle exchanges
and condoning prostitution in Africa (Kaplan, 2005, p. 188-99). Money even began
funneling directly to churches in Nigeria, Uganda, and Kenya from the President’s
Emergency Fund for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) (Kaoma, 2009). These funds were also used
to promote abstinence-only HIV/AIDS prevention programs. This is just one example of
many of the rising influence the Christian Right has had in dictating foreign policy and
international development.

Current Political Landscape
Within the last two administrations we have not seen a significant shift from what
Bush started in 2001. In fact, during the Obama administration the Reverend Jim Wallis
stated, “There has been an incredible amount of outreach to the faith community from
this administration. I’ve never seen so much before” (Marsden, 2008, p. 960; PBS, 2009).
The biggest changes from the Obama administration to the CFBCI was remaining it to be
more inclusive of neighborhood coalitions, in large part due to Obama’s heavy history in
community organizing. The Obama era office also created a new focus on “collaborative
partnership between the US Government and community-based US NGOs,” (Marsden,
2008, p. 99.) Falling into what we would recognize from the FBO typology table as more
Faith-Secular Partnerships. After Obama’s rebranding of the OCFBI and executive orders
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banning prioritizing one religion over another for funding that the administration had
begun to help level the “playing field for secular organizations” (Marsden, 2008, 963).
However, this over looks repeat offenders like Samaritan’s Purse and others who can
continually rely on funding. Despite the cosmetic changes to the office and the restriction
to proselytize, the practices FBOs utilize to receive funds remain largely the same. Even
now in 2017 there are few punitive mechanisms for individuals who engage in
proselytism and few mechanisms to monitor financial accountability and stewardship.
The Trump administration has yet to make any large changes to the CFCBI but
the connection Trump holds with evangelicals is even more tangible. He blatantly offered
Christians deals in exchange for being voted into office such as “Christians should vote
for me because if I’m there, you’re going to have plenty of power. You don’t need
anybody else.” Or my personal favorite, “Vote for me, and I will give you Supreme Court
picks and abolish the Johnson Amendment.” (Sapp, 2016; Green, 2016). If the Johnson
Amendment were repealed, pastors would be able to endorse candidates from the pulpit,
which they’re currently not allowed to do by law. It would also allow more money to
flow directly into politics from church donations. Repealing the Johnson amendment
means religious groups become even more powerful political forces in American politics
as we live in the days post Citizens United v. FEC.
After the 2016 election, pollsters credit the Christian Right for electing Trump
into office. Specifically, Pew Research Center reported that 80% of evangelicals voted
for Trump despite his blatantly un-Christian behaviors (divorce, adultery, crass language,
etc.) (Smith and Martinez, 2016). Finally, Trump has reinstated the Mexico City policy
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weeks after stepping into office meaning that any NGO that offers, recommends, or
consults on abortions has had their funding pulled inhibiting their ability to offer
international aid and development resources. This has disproportionately impacted
secular NGOs who are the only ones that typically offer these services and once more
gives the leg up to FBOs to secure government funds.

Conclusion
As the Religious Right became a prominent voting bloc in the United States, they
were able to influence presidential administrations to carve out structures of power
reserved for them in exchange for their continued support. This signified an interesting
transition which began as conservative politicians from the Reagan administration
creating values for the group to then having the group actualize as a collective and dictate
foreign policy decisions. This chapter illustrates the mythic reality of the Religious Right
and analyzes the basis of their rise to power through Bush’s creation of the Office of
Faith-Based Community Initiatives. This rise to power was predicated on the back of a
fallacy itself, a myth, that FBOs are ideal or preferable providers of social services and
aid. In fact, there is little to no accountability required in this process so the ideograph of
stewardship functions as a hollow promise meant to reassure donors. Or as McGee would
argue, the rise of this mythic reality is predicated on a combination of ideographs where
“Each term would be a connector, specifier, or contrary for those fundamental historical
commitments, giving them a meaning and a unity easily mistaken for logic” (1980, p.
433). Clearly, there is a “logic” missing to justify the immense and rapid rise of FBOs
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while making it harder for secular NGOs to get involved in international aid and
development.
Today, the landscape of international development is evolving thanks to the creation
of the CFBCI and rise of the Religious Right. International aid and development “is
increasingly populated by small-scale, faith-based, and short-term volunteers” (Schnable,
2015; Wuthnow, 2009). Many are skeptical that this will change significantly in the near
future as the Religious Right continue to hold their place of power in the Trump
administration.
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Chapter Six: Exporting “Family Values” to Uganda
Thus far, I have covered how ideographs function in development literature, for
FBOs, and for the Christian Right. In this chapter, I explore how the West capitalized on
colonization by using rhetoric to manipulate and exploit populations for centuries in subSaharan Africa. Through looking at the case study of FBO intervention in Uganda and
formation of Ugandan national policy we can expose the impacts of rhetorical identity
construction using Cloud’s method of ideographic critique and McGee’s analysis of
constitutive rhetoric. To begin, I analyze the history and implications of colonization, I
will highlight the tactics colonizers used that carry such significant implications these
tactics influence policy in nations like Uganda to this day. I argue that through official
colonizing tactics as well as through unofficial tactics (namely the use of FBOs and
Christian missionaries) the West was able to mold and control African behavior and
identity. Due to the rhetorical intervention of erasing and rewriting myths, Western
intervention and dependence still occurs. In order to understand how this process
occurred, I will examine the case study of Uganda and the treatment of the LGBTQIA
community. Spoiler alert: the gross mistreatment of these communities derives from a
long-standing narrative that to be gay is “un-African.” This myth was created by Western
powers and tragically pervasively exists today largely as a remnant of colonialization.
Through examining the myth built around the ideograph of stewardship, I
documented the history of how evangelicals were able to engage in the state department,
social services, and were able to create a de facto “pay to play” system for international
development work. Through the culmination of these actions, the stage was set not only
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for state sponsored FBO intervention but compassionate conservatism to take root in
other countries across the globe. When evangelicals began expanding the reach of where
the Religious Right was able to engage they fundamentally amplified their ability to
voice their beliefs to a larger audience. Through targeted and collective action on behalf
of the American Religious Right, the “body of Christ” focused on sub-Saharan Africa
with renewed and near religious fervor.
By the conclusion of this chapter, I will have proven that the history of Ugandan
sexuality was rewritten by Western colonizers through the use of Christian missionaries
and the FBO network during colonization. Since these networks and tactics are still
employed, this myth continues to exist today much to the detriment of the LGBTQ
community in nations like Uganda. Historically, FBO networks were so pervasive and
effective in disseminating Christian values because they relied on the same proselytizing
practices by missionaries today. Though as previously mentioned, these practices have
been relabeled as “outreach tactics” to fit the rhetoric of the development field as well as
the rhetoric of the church. Finally, I will illustrate the harms of allowing exclusionary
narratives to exist by highlighting the ideograph that creates that damning narrative:
“family values.”

Reconstructing African History and Identity
The colonization of Africa provided an unprecedented opportunity for constitutive
rhetoric to play out on monumental scales. As Western Imperialists colonized the
continent, they forced their ideals, languages, and practices onto local populations while
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exporting in mass natural resources and indigenous people to colonizers’ homelands.
Specifically, these stolen “exports” were used to further the interests of the imperialist
nations as local populations were enslaved and forced to harvest these resources for their
occupiers. Many populations chose to comply and cater to colonizers’ demands because
they faced severe retaliation if they did not cooperate.
Spanning from the 15th to the 19th century, European colonizers left devastation in
their wake on individual, societal, and continental levels. One of many examples being
the grotesquely violent conduct of King Leopold and the legacy of his Belgium colonies
in Africa (these colonies are now modern-day Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo). King Leopold ordered the hands of colonized Africans to be
chopped off if they did not meet the King’s quotas for rubber (Hochschild, 2000).
Beyond this barbaric physical maiming inflicted on innocent civilians, colonies were
metaphysically marred by abuses in myth-making. Colonizers employed rhetoric to
subjugate native populations over the span of decades so both mentally and physically the
colonized found themselves under the control of their occupiers.
Africa has been known as the “resource cursed continent” with “a third of the
planet’s mineral reserves, a tenth of the oil and . . . two-thirds of the diamonds” (The
Economist, 2015) in addition to a plethora of natural resources such as timber, animal
products. Centuries ago, even more important than these precious resources was that
Africa was the key to trading routes to the East as far as Europeans were concerned. As
Westerners developed the ability to traverse the seas, the continent was overrun with
nations willing to exploit indigenous populations in order to control said resources and

98

trade routes. Westerners were largely successful due to their technological advantage.
Colonizers held a prowess over steel production, domestication techniques and guns
(Diamond, 2012). Using force, colonizers were able to restructure, exploit and enslave
local communities. Societies were reconfigured into colonies as tribes were forced
together into artificially constructed borders drawn up in closed meeting rooms in
European parliaments.
Arguably one of the most harmful decrees from the West prohibited individuals
from speaking their native language and “encouraged” Africans to adopt the language of
their colonizers. Sadly, this encouragement was a thinly-veiled euphuism for brute force.
In reality, the repercussions for using native languages would result in punishments
spanning from at best beatings and at worse death or imprisonment. Some of these laws
continue to exist today. Some schools in Uganda still practice corporal punishment when
students speak in their native language (Segawa, 2017; Msegigire, 2014) much to the
anger and despair of cultural activists.
With the threat of being shot and killed, this effectively deterred individuals from
speaking their language and ultimately hindered their ability to pass on their people’s
history from one generation to the next. This was uniquely harmful insofar as it destroyed
the rich oral tradition of countless communities across Africa. because the majority of
these communities passed down their traditions, culturally relevant myths, and history
orally rather than via transcription (Diamond, 2012). By prohibiting the practice or
learning of a culture’s language, generations of oral histories were erased. Tragically, this

99

left room for colonizers to rewrite the history of the communities they occupied at their
own transgression.
Granted, this does not mean that a tribe’s history was immediately erased entirely
nor that it was replaced overnight with imported Western values. Colonizers initially
struggled gaining access and control to the private lives of citizens. So, households or
secluded communities became a safe haven to communicate with one another freely and
avoid trans-historical occupancy colonizers. However, as generations passed away their
stories and languages began to pass away as well. Especially as harsh punishments
deterred the younger generations from learning their people’s myths, components of
cultural identity were lost and will never be recovered due to the unique nature of
squelching a vibrant oral tradition. Capitalizing on this silence concerning myths,
Western colonizers were able to supply their own myths and teachings through school
curriculum, ordinances by state governing bodies, and through the rhetoric used in
religious institutions. Behind these pulpits in schools and churches, colonizers dictated
new realities into existence.
Narratives are a crucial component of rhetoric and identity creation. As McGee
articulates “the clearest access to persuasion (and hence to ideology) is through the
discourse used to produce it” (1980, p. 427). Through erasing oral history and
degenerating the culture of countless tribes, colonizers were given an unprecedented
ability to force “a myth change” on populaces as they controlled mainstream discourse
and were in a position to impart ideology in addition to requiring the adoption of an alien
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language. This in many ways set up a “perfect storm” for McGee’s description of
constitutive rhetoric to play out on a massive scale. As McGee explains,
As myth change, “generations” change, and with the new generation comes a new
“people,” defined not by circumstances or behavior, but by their collective faith in
a rhetorical vision. . . . each political myth presupposes a “people” who can
legislate reality with their collective belief. So long as “the people” believe basic
myths, there is unity and collective identity. When there is no fundamental belief,
one senses a crisis which can only be met with a new rhetoric, a new mythology.
(1975, p. 246)
In this instance, the lack of “fundamental belief” did not derive from a choice on the
behalf of a people who willing selected out of a “basic myth” set. Rather, it was imposed
upon them in order to form a collective identity of “colonized” by the colonizers because
they would be easier to manage.
A “new rhetoric” and “mythology” emerged not only in how the West talked about its
colonies (Said, 1978) but how those living in colonized Africa began conceptualizing
their own identity (collectively and individually). For instance, Dr. Dana Cloud draws
upon the rhetoric surrounding Dr. Samuel Huntington’s theory of the <Clash of
Civilizations> and how the West continues to use this rhetoric to justify imperialist
intervention as we see play out in the “War on Terror.” Specifically, the West described
(and continues to describe) the colonized as “uncivilized,” “barbaric,” “savage,” and
incapable of self-governance. This characterization creates an image of the oppressed to
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be “an ‘inferior’ civilization” which in turn prompts a paternalistic and aggressive
intervention from the oppressor, the colonizer (Cloud, 2004, p. 286).
In the case of African colonization, the aggressive intervention manifested in the form
of a violent occupation, stripping away tribe’s history through force, and reconstituting
the identities of individuals to subjugate local populations as inferior. Ultimately,
colonization allowed for a myth of “helpless and savage” to take roots so that Africans
and other colonizers projected that the colonized needed “saving from themselves”
(Cloud, 2004, p. 286). Historian Marc Epprecht explicitly documents how this process
occurred:
Dogmatic revulsion against same-sex behaviors, acts, relationships, and thoughts
was introduced into the region by European colonialists and preachers,” who
characterized such acts as signs of backwardness, he says. “Africans were
encouraged through these discourses to equate homophobic constructions of
sexuality with civilization and progress. (Epprecht, 2008, p. 53)
Though the days of colonialism have allegedly passed, this insidious, pervasive myth
of inferiority and helplessness continues to exist in legislation, attitudes, rhetoric, and
practices of former colonizers and in regards to internalized oppression of the formerly
colonized to this day.

FBO Role in Rewriting History
Many of the aforementioned colonizing tactics represented official steps taken by
the West to reconstitute the identity of African tribes. However, these official tactics
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would not have been nearly as effective without being paired with unofficial tactics to act
as a complement. Specifically, Christian missionaries and FBOs from the West acting in
less official capacities, flooded into the continent to preach salvation and their cultural
values (such as implementing structures of capitalism, practices like monogamy, and
imparting notions of “civilization”). The presence of these missionaries represented one
of the first forms of international development and aid. Scholars like Githuku recognize
that Christianity was used explicitly to “sever East Africans from traditional, cultural, and
religious practices and beliefs” (2010; Blevins, 2011, p. 57). This outreach was critical in
the implementation of embedding Western values into the African colonies.
These Western missionaries also engaged with different populations than their
formal counterparts. Missionaries were planted into communities. There they worked
with individuals and families giving FBOs invaluable access into their homes. This
access was coveted by the colonizers’ home states as the state could not reach that level
of integration on its own accord. Hansen and Twaddle write in their book Religion &
Politics in East Africa,
Colonial officials sought to build societies in East Africa. In Uganda, for
example, a government circular pointed out that it was ‘desirous of
encouraging the spread of Christian principles’” (1995, p. 223)
Colonizers believed they could make this dream a reality due to a foundational
belief held by both missionaries and government officials. They believed that “building a
Christian society could only be accomplished on the foundation of a Christian family”
(Hansen & Twaddle, 1995, p. 233). This was viewed as desirable from the government’s
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perspective because “the family is the basic and smallest unit of social organizations, all
religions have an interest in influencing it” (Hansen & Twaddle, 1995) and, as previously
discussed, to export values deemed acceptable by the West.
Religious values and cultural ideology are very closely linked. By having direct
access to family units, FBOs were not only able to spread government ideals in the form
of Christian values but they were encouraged to do so by the colonizing powers.
Ultimately, rather than mandate change from a top-down policy oriented approach,
colonizers acted through churches, missions, and FBO networks to disseminate values.
Since they worked through a bottom-up approach, they were able to win the hearts and
minds of communities through delivering much needed resources and social services thus
infiltrating the private lives of the colonized as well as maintaining control of their public
lies.
In the case of Uganda, missionaries from Christian churches targeted the local
populations’ hungry stomachs, aching bodies, and young minds who came to them in
need of an English education. Once members of local populations flocked to churches to
receive aid, churches began offering more social services like English language
education, providing resources for infrastructure, digging wells, or offering food. While
receiving this aid, FBOs would impart cultural and Christian values onto recipients
through proselytizing practices. Meaning that students would be expected to learn
English by learning the scriptures and hungry populations would listen to sermons in
exchange for receiving food. In the 1800 and 1900s, laws against proselytism did not
exist. Instead, coercive practices meant to convert Africans were actually encouraged by
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the state as colonizers viewed these practices and FBO networks as the best way to
“civilize” Africans.
The lines between church sponsored social services and religious teaching
quickly muddled together (much to the pleasure of the state). The state forged a close
relationship with FBOs (a.k.a. Christian missions) through constant contact and in
exchange the church was able to formalize a position of power in governments.
Specifically, missionaries gained easier access to colonial lawmakers resulting in
renewed agility in maneuvering around existing laws and creating laws to benefit their
religious objectives. For instance, one Anglican bishop wrote, in no uncertain terms, that
when the British mandated Ugandan educational policy to be administered by FBOs “the
control of schools gave the church ‘a marvelous opportunity of moulding a nation at its
formative stage” (Hansen & Twaddle, 1995, p. 230). Education was then used as a tool to
“mould” the nation of Uganda into adapting Christian values in the hopes of creating a
Christian nation.
Beyond creating a Christian nation, Western powers wanted to create a Christian
elite to work with. Once again looking to Uganda, Hansen and Twaddle describe that
FBOs would concentrate their resources on teaching the children of chiefs Christianity in
order to “build an economically powerful elite that is Christian” (1995, p. 230). The
thought process was that by making a Christian elite it would allow for easier interaction
between the colonizers and the colonized. By forcing the African elite to adapt similar
values and educational background, it would not only link the two groups ideologically,
it would be easier to work with Africans by erasing cultural divides.
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When British government officials took over the administration of Uganda, they found that
Christian missions offered education as part of their evangelization process. Education was
not only a means controlled by missionaries to produce the type of citizens they desired
but also a powerful vehicle of elite recruitment. It was an agent that literally recruited the
elite of a colonial society from the masses. It was also a means of upward social mobility
for those caught up in its embrace. (Hansen & Twaddle, 1995, p. 229)
In addition to controlling education, FBOs and Christian missionaries were able to
legislate Christian values during colonial times. For example, crafting the Marriage
Ordinance of 1902 and 1903 in Uganda which solidified Christian notions of traditional
marriage between a man and a woman (Hansen & Twaddle, 1995, p. 241). Even more
concrete and less subtle, however, was the legislative victories in the 1900 agreement
which “established the victorious Christian chides in positions of political and economic
power; based chieftainship on religious affiliation; gave Christian chiefs freehold land;
and created a landed Christian aristocracy with enormous local power” (Makerere, 1957;
Hansen & Twaddle, 1995, p. 237). The state and the church worked hand in hand to
create new rules to suit their relationship and their goal of spreading Western, aka
Christian values, to their colonized territories.
The most effective way to transform a nation is to erase the history of older
generations and indoctrinate younger generations with a new political myth while they
are young. This statement is not merely an unfounded claim of my own, tragically, it is
the summary of the tactics the British employed when colonizing eastern Africa. By
controlling education and consolidating power in politics, FBOs were able to spread
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Christian values during colonialism with dizzying speeds.

What are Christian Values?
The dissemination of Christian values from the West to their colonies has been
occurring for centuries. Spanning from early explorers planting flags and building
churches on foreign lands to more formalized campaigns like the crusades or funding
Christian-based education systems, the spread of Christian values has utilized overt force
and coopted more subtle means. Regardless, FBOs have been key actors in spreading
both religious and cultural ideology to all corners of the globe. In the African context
uniquely, these values were carried and implanted into communities by Christian
missionaries and FBOs since the 1800s. Over 200 years later, missionaries to Africa still
utilize the same proselytizing practices and similar rhetoric to justify “outreach” to Africa
on similar premises. Through critically examining how the American Religious Right
currently use FBOs to export cultural values in Uganda, I prove why FBOs today build
on the damning legacy of FBOs in the past as they continue to rely on centuries old
practices of delivering development resources and services to pursue neocolonial
objectives.
Dr. Dana Cloud’s work concerning ideographic critique was developed in her
analysis of the ideograph of <family values> in her article, “The Rhetoric of <Family
Values>: Scapegoating, Utopia, and the Privatization of Social Responsibility.” Within
this analysis Cloud reiterates McGee’s stance that ideographs are “Ideological slogans
[that] construct a society’s key commitments are powerful tools of political language”
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(Cloud, 1998, pg. 389) and adds that ideographs house an inherent “dimension of social
control and coercion” (Cloud, 1998, pg. 389) making it imperative to understand and
critically examine ideographs when encountered. Through analyzing the rhetoric of
politicians in the 1990s, Cloud links <family values> to other concepts like
“responsibility” and the ideal (typically white) nuclear family.
Together these ideographs draw back to a mythical narrative, a utopian view of when
family values allegedly thrived in the 1950s. Cloud then carries ideographic critique to its
logical conclusion which are that when used and analyzed in these clusters, politicians
create a mythic reality to situate their audiences within. This can lead to political action
as evidenced by Ugandans’ support for the Anti-Homosexuality Act or as politicians in
the US and Africa use rhetoric to constitute the identities of individuals who do not fall
within the parameters of the myth.
Cloud’s analysis showed that ideographs are not a dangerous hypothetical, rather the
rhetoric we use can result in real harm to individuals and legislate into reality.
Specifically, when individuals in power are allowed to create a narrative that perpetuates
a fictitious myth, it allows them to define the measures of success to benefit themselves
and their positionality. By drawing on this fiction it effectively allowed politicians to
prioritize an unattainable utopian standard that never existed while demonizing those who
couldn’t reach this standard, namely the poor and people of color (as in the demonization
of families “headed by single parents, racial minorities, and the poor” (Cloud, 1998, pg.
411)).
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“Family values” has become a weaponized term used against the poor (those who
took welfare money set aside by the state) and used against non-whites in America. This
weaponization is not harmful in constituting identity on its own, rather it is harmful when
it carves a space that purposefully excludes individuals from being “socially acceptable”.
When these individuals can’t measure up to this arbitrary standard, they fall outside its
confines and earn the scorn of the society. Astonishingly, family values continue to
accomplish the same objectives when used by the American Religious Right and FBOs in
Africa. However, the myth has now evolved to shift away from targeting the poor and
racial minorities as Cloud originally hypothesized. Instead, family values have been
repurposed as a weapon to target and demonize the LGBTQ community in Africa.
Ultimately, this weaponziation is what laid the ground work for the homophobic
campaigns we see today occurring in Uganda to be codified into law.

The Myth that Homosexuality is Un-African
Uganda has a reputation as one of the most heavily evangelized nations in the world
(Rice, 2004). Further, Roger Williams, the director of the award-winning documentary
God Loves Uganda describes Uganda as the number one destination for American
missionaries in the world. In 2017, a report by the Pew Research Center estimated that up
to 87% of Ugandans were Christian, 12% were Muslim, and less than 1% of the
population identified as unaffiliated or ascribing to traditional folk religion ( “The
Changing Global Religious Landscape,” 2017). While it is impossible to calculate the
exact amount of money invested into Uganda by FBOs, it is entirely plausible to
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recognize that the presence of Christian missionaries in Uganda has been a critical feature
of Uganda since the late 1800s. Many scholars believe this factor heavily contributes to
the high rate of Christian Ugandans in the 21st century.
One of the most disastrous remnants of FBO presence over the scope of the last two
and a half centuries has been the rewriting of history concerning the presence of LGBTQ
in the nation and the continent. As covered earlier in this chapter, erasing the living
history of most African nations provided space for colonizers to move in and dictate a
new history. The narratives that filled this vacuum were often carefully crafted inventions
of the West meant to forward their interests at the expense of the locals. The narrative
that colonizers put in place back in colonial times feeds an oppressive social reality to
this day. This is important because it illustrates that myths do not stay fictitious, overtime
they can be legislated into reality.
In a 2009 report titled “Exporting Cultural Wars” Dr. Kapya Kaomo cites a BBC
report which quotes Nigeria’s President Olusegun Obasanjo’s address to African church
leaders in Nigeria and Uganda that homosexuality “is clearly un-Biblical, unnatural and
definitely un-African” (p. 13). The narrative that homosexuality is “not natural, it is not
moral; and it’s not African” (Kaomo, 2009) is not an abnormality. Sadly, it exists across
the continent as a result of careful narrative construction by Christian colonizers.
The myth that homosexuality is a Western invention exists today despite the
ample evidence that homosexuality existed in Africa in prehistoric times (as depicted by
cave drawings) and even pre-colonial times (as documented in groups like the Bahima,
the Banvoro, and the Baganada (Mugisha 2014; Lewis, 2011; Oliver, 2013; Tamale,
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2009, 2013)). The myth erasing the history of homosexuality has spread across Uganda
and across the continent. This myth, as McGee stated it would, has evolved as the
“people” evolved. I want to trace back the evolution of this myth to see how it, and the
ideographs used to support it, have evolved over the last 200 years.
One of the easiest ways to trace the views of homosexuality in Uganda is via the
constantly changing narrative of Uganda’s last ruler pre-colonization, King Mwanga II.
Scholars like Dr. John Blevins have traced the evolution of this narrative as FBOs have
used it to propel their agendas since the insemination of colonization to the present day.
Today, it is used to legitimize the plight of Christians in passing anti-LGBTQ policy and
to demonize the sin of homosexuality. In many ways, the story of King Mwanga II
functions within a larger myth of homosexuality as un-African and more importantly is
drawn upon to justify the discrimination and violence against queer bodies in Uganda.
Before seeing how Mwanga’s story evolved, we first have to trace back the
evolution of the myth that “homosexuality is un-African.” The origin of this mythic
narrative is twisted as it has been created and repurposed as a tool of imperialism for
many years. There are three unique historical events that stand out in particular that I will
point to indicate the evolutions. Coincidentally, during these times Mwanga’s narrative
was repurposed as well. I will use Mwanga’s narrative as a measuring stick to gage the
mentality of the people concerning LGBTQ folks. Interstingly, these myths also began to
compound on one another allowing the myth to live and grow over time with the culture.
This process constantly constituted the identities of the LGBTQ individuals in Africa as
well as the communities defining themselves in opposition to them.
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Initially, Christians in colonial times blamed the existence of homosexuality in
Africa as a product of Muslim influence (Blevins, 2012, pg. 58). This was done to
demonize both homosexuals and Muslims as being uncivilized, immoral, and animal-like
(Blevins, 2012; Epprecht, 2008). This is evidenced by explorers like Sir Richard Burton
and Andrew Battell who wrote in their journals about their journeys to and experiences in
Africa recording homosexual behavior as early as the 1500s (Epprecht, 2008, p. 37).
FBOs and Christian missionaries were told to go to specifically work to “civilize”
Africans as they determined homosexuality to be “improper,” “unnatural,” and “lewd”
(Wahab, 2016). This rhetoric from Western explorers coincides perfectly with Said’s
argument concerning orientalism that the West referred to those in Africa, Asia, and the
Middle East as uncivilized. They demonized the influence of Islam with the mentality
that those living in the Orient and Africa “needed saving from themselves” (1978). This
mentality justifies to Westerners that not only could they benefit financially from
colonizing Africa but that they ought do so from a principled standpoint as well.
Tragically, this couldn’t have been further from the truth.
It should also be noted that nature of LGBTQ practices in pre-colonized Africa
were different. African men and women would engage in same- sex interactions and not
identify as “gay,” “queer,” or “lesbian.” Rather, these interactions would be so
commonplace it was simply normal to do so. Even ritual component of “wealth
medicine” (Epprecht, 2008, p. 37) might entail engaging in same sex intercourse as
individuals believed that “wealth medicine” would lead to prosperity in business, virility,
or success against rivals. Many Africans pre-colonization would maintain heterosexual

112

relations and engage in outside relations with a member of the same sex. They wouldn’t
necessarily choose one over the other, they would simply have causal same-sex
interactions in addition to the heterosexual relationship. Meaning that individuals
wouldn’t typically define themselves based on same sex interactions in the ways that
Westerners did. In many ways, this meant that these practices were so commonplace the
silence surrounding them indicated how normalized they had become. Yet, instead of
recognizing this reality, colonizers exploited African’s silence on the matter and
conflated this lack of discussion as a lack of presence of interest.
Erasing the presence of LGBTQ members and practices in society was
exacerbated when colonizers began enforcing language restrictions and constructing new
vocabularies. Namely, a major component of language control came when missionaries
and early colonial officials were in charge of the creation of dictionaries for the
colonized. When they encountered a word or phrase they determined to be “obscene”
they would either not provide a translation for the word or would replace it with a “crude
and judgmental translation” (Epprecht, 2008, p. 41). For instance, “sodomite” replaced
many African words for “ritual same-sex practices or gender-inverted roles” (Epprecht,
2008, p. 41) and encompassed practices ranging from bestiality to the vague concept of
“heterosexual debauchery.” Through these practices, colonizers exploited the relative
silence surrounding LGBTQ practices and attitudes by filling this quiet contentedness
with weaponized rhetoric that effectively instilled venomous stigma into societies.
Colonizers then matched cultural narratives to fit the tone set by their dictation
processes. For instance, during colonization the colonizers altered the story of King
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Mwanga to suit their needs. In this iteration King Mwanga II killed the 29 couriers for
being Christians. This represented a significant shift from the original iterations of this
myth. Instead of using it to justify paternalistic Western intervention to save Africans
from themselves as it had been used originally, the narrative shifted to fortify an “us
versus them” mentality to engulf sympathetic Africans. The story of King Mwanga
focused on the need for Western intervention to protect “civilized Africans” from
“uncivilized Africans” who would hurt Christians. By evolving the narrative, it was able
to critically bond Africans who had come to ascribe to Western values (especially recent
Christian converts) and otherize those who did not support the colonizers. Davies, Steele,
and Markus write “According to social identity theory, such identity threats often lead to
a heightening of in-group identity” (2008). Effectively, this iteration of the narrative pit
Africans against one another, those who had “proper” values and those who felt
differently. In group fighting began to happen giving colonizers more power to do as they
pleased since the colonized were no longer fighting colonial rule as much as they were
fighting one another.
In the 1980s, AIDS/HIV activists wanted to separate homosexuality from the
AIDS endemic. It was actually considered a monumental success to some activists when
Africans across the continent unequivocally claimed that homosexuality was virtually
nonexistent within their nations therefore homosexuality or bisexuality should not be
linked as the causation of Africa having the highest concentration of AIDS/HIV. The
well-meaning intentions of activists to de-associate AIDS with homosexuality meant to
help break the stigma surrounding homosexuality. However, in perpetuating the myth
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that homosexuality did not exist in Africa, it further alienated the very real, very present
communities of LGBTQ folks in Africa. Essentially, the narrative evolved to erase almost
entirely the plight of LGBTQ which in the long run made it easier to discriminate against
them through the most recent policy developments.
In the early 2000s after success directing intervention in Sudan, the Religious
Right were able to gain federal funding to enter into communities to fight AIDS in
Africa. Christian FBOs, armed with ideology in one hand and resources to dole out in the
other, took Africa by storm. Through the Office of Faith-Based and Community
Initiatives the Bush administration gave $15 billion to fight AIDS/HIV in Africa
(Marsden, 2008, p. 249). A third of which was earmarked for abstinence focused
outreach. The logic of the Christian Right was best articulated by our current Vice
President, Mike Pence who said on the house floor, “Teach abstinence and send them
values that work not condoms” (God Loves Uganda, 2013). This value focused funding
largely went to FBOs, 98% of which were Christian (Stockman et. al, 2006), to
administer education and aid in the AIDS epidemic. These FBOs would then use
practices that coincided with “Christian values” and “family values.” This resulted in
promoting “ABC” programs (referring to AIDS prevention program that taught
“abstinence; be faithful; and use condoms as a last resort for couples where one partner
was infected” (Green, 2003, p. 6; Marsden, 2008, p. 6)), bans on needle exchanges,
forbidding the use of condoms, and the refusal to recognize the lifestyles of sex workers
or the LGBTQ community writ large (Kaplan, 2005, pp. 188-99; Marsden, 2008, p. 249).
For many FBOs this policy change acted as a foot in the door for the Religious
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Right to turn their mission focus to Africa. As discussed in the last chapter, some FBOs
were able to receive state funding to proselytize while others were able to enter through
the creation of a “pay to play” system for international development and aid that resulted
in liberal Western governments cutting state spending on welfare and development
programs. In a two birds one stone move, republicans in the United States were able to
cut state spending on welfare and soft power and outsourcing to willing, and cheaper,
partners like FBOs.
Once in the door, evangelicals along with their African church partners, altered
the narrative of King Mwanga II yet again. In the early 2000s, the story of King Mwanga
was altered once again. Now the Christian martyrs were killed for their refusal to engage
in sexual relations with Mwanga. When the African Christian converts refused to partake
in sodomy, their deaths were memorialized as one of the first groups of Christian martyrs
in Uganda. The most fascinating component of the Baganda martyrology is that
“in the decades immediately after the massacre, there were no Baganda who
spoke of sodomy. Interpretations of the event have shifted and will continue
to do so. Such shifts illumine the contestations between Western influences
and Ugandan perspectives” (Blevins, 2011, p. 62).
At this point, Uganda had been noted as one of the most heavily evangelized
nations in the world, with 85% of its populations identifying as Christians. Ugandans
now identified with the martyrs more than with their former king Mwanga II.
Evangelicals and Ugandans would use this latest iteration of the Baganda Martyrs to
justify that homosexuality was not African. Rather, the narrative claimed Africans stood

116

against homosexuality and were willing to die to fight it even before being told it was
“wrong” by colonizers.
The great irony is that Africans vehemently reject homosexuality and LGBTQIA
acceptance because they believe both to be Western constructs. Tragically, this overlooks
that this narrative of LGBTQ being “un-African” is a carefully composed Western
invention. Worse yet, it is an invention that has pitted Africans against one another. Take
for example a direct quote from Canon Joshua Foluso Taiwo of Nigeria who said in no
uncertain terms,
Homosexuality has never been part of our [society] that man will be
sleeping with man; nothing like lesbianism in our dictionary. All
these came from the West. I can tell you this. I have spent more than
five decades on earth... We did not hear of homosexuality until late
in the twentieth century when I first heard about it from the army.
Many people who went into peace operations in [Europe] brought
it. (Kaomo, 2009, p. 13)
Instead of fighting off the remnants of colonization, Ugandans buying into this
insidious and fictitious myth have taken action to legislate their beliefs into reality. In
doing so African communities have given more power to Western entities like Christian
missionaries and FBOs creating a new form of dependence on the West for moral
direction. Kaomo writes “the claim that homosexuality is un-African arises from the
politics of postcolonial identity, which rejects anything “western” (2009, p. 9). Due to the
unique scope FBOs have access to, FBOs can directly target a myriad of groups: the
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young, individuals living in poverty, or families looking to gain social mobility through
access to social service (microloans, education programs, workfare training, healthcare,
etc.). After working with FBOs and being exposed to their ideology, or at worst their
proselytizing practices, these communities are more likely to buy into the collectivization
process that FBOs offer. As McGee and Charland articulate, this collectivization process
can lead to groupthink as in adopting similar values and ideals which in turn can lead to
mass political action.
This played out most clearly when Ugandans in 2009 supported legislation to
solidify the mythic reality of “family values” into a legally binding force. Two examples
being when Ugandan politician, David Bahati, proposed the Anti-Homosexuality Bill in
2009. The second when colonizers were able to set the parameters of marriage to be
between one man and one woman in Uganda through the 1900 Agreement vis-à-vis the
Marriage Ordinance both instances reflect taking a belief, that homosexuality is immoral
thus should be illegal, and solidify into state policy.
This mirrors the process the Peuple Quebecois used in publishing their white
paper on the origins of their people. Charland explains “At particular historical moments,
political rhetoric can reposition or rearticulate subjects by performing ideological work
upon the texts in which social actors are inscribed” (Charland, 1987, p. 147). In this
instance, Ugandans codified their “political rhetoric” into the penal code and by working
within a binding text they were able to redefine the roles of social actors. Isolating these
“particular historical moments” can be immensely difficult as these politicians did not
appear spontaneously. Rather, these politicians may be the product of decades or
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centuries of ideological exposure, converts themselves, they may rely on the support of
their evangelical constituents (both at home and abroad), or most likely a combination of
the aforementioned. Regardless, it is important to recognize the very real power of
constitute rhetoric in crafting new realities by drawing on shared belief in myths, political
action, and constraining the roles of other individuals.

Exporting “Values Education” to the East
The constant evolution in the narrative of King Mwanga and the Christian
Martyrs are but one rhetorical tactic used by FBOs in colonial times and today.
Essentially, the narrative acts as a marker of societal views held by the west or the
directions the west attempted to steer Ugandans toward. More importantly however, it is
critical to dive deeper into understanding the mechanisms used to manipulate the
direction of society. Explicitly, in how the evolution of this narrative was made possible.
Through the rhetorical evolution and manipulation of the ideographs of “family values”
and “value education” in official and unofficial capacities, the West able to alter mindsets
of communities they worked with. These ideographs acted as the means to disseminate
values and reeducate the population on large scales by working with families, rural, and
urban communities as well as the young and old. The age-old strategy of proselytism
through the actor of FBOs would allow Western powers, in nations like Uganda, to reeducate the local populace through “values education” while delivering key services like
healthcare, education, and aid. Just as it worked centuries ago, this strategy ultimately
allowed Western powers to consolidate power during colonial times and today are still
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used but seldom recognized as a form of Western neo-colonialism.
It is often said that only the victors write history. However, in the case of
colonization in Uganda, the colonizers went a step beyond this axiom and were able to
actively manipulate history in order to recategorize a nation’s values. By switching
values and hierarchy to prioritize Westerners, Western beliefs, and Western religion they
were able to ensure continued victory in colonized lands. As previously mentioned, there
are multiple statements from high ranking colonial officials (both in England and on the
ground in Uganda at the turn of the 19th and 20th century) which clearly evidence the
British intended to make Uganda a Christian nation. Officials also made it abundantly
evident that they would do so by reeducating the populace through state and FBO efforts.
It is important to recognize that education went beyond simply teaching arithmetic.
Education, when controlled by the church or a theistic state, would incorporate values
and pillars of religion as dictated by those in power. When education is reformatted
through a Christian lens, it can easily replace a people’s tradition in culture when that
culture is silenced through the threat of violence. The ability to dictate a national identity
by working through children gives an unprecedented amount of opportunity for those in
power in both the immediate and long-term future.
Thus far, the three FBOs I have highlighted as doing commercialized international
development and aid are World Vision, Compassion International, and the National
Evangelical Association. World Vision, the agency that receives millions in government
funding annually advertises on their “Christian Faith” page that “3,494,939 children and
youth participation in discipleship and values education” (2018). By capitalizing on the
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vague term of “values education” it allows for FBOs to use ideographs, or dog whistle
words, in plain sight. This is important because it signals to donors the nature of the
outreach they are doing while the state is able to happily reside within the myth that
FBOs are the best philanthropic partner to deliver aid and development resources because
they do not proselytize. Similarly, Compassion International has posted testimonials from
their Compassion Child program alumni describing the merits of their value education.
For instance, Tannia from Ethiopia attests, “The compassion program really helped me
become a person with Godly values, a person who interacts well with others and a person
who believes in hard work” (“15 Successful Compassion Alumni Share About Life After
Sponsorship,” 2017). “Godly values” is just as abstract and devoid of intuitive meaning
as “family values.” What is key to both organizations using the ideograph of “value
education” is the FBO can choose what values to embed into these abstract and empty
terms. They then face little to no accountability due to the ambiguous labelling of
promoting “family values” and “values education.”
While the Bible does dictate certain values. Such as “Honor thy father and mother”
(Exodus 20:5), “Do not wear clothing of mixed fibers” (Deuteronomy 22:11), and “Love
thy neighbor as thy self” (Matthew 22:39). Yet, there is very little if any direct value
dictation within the scriptures on modern-day issues (including but not limited to:
sexuality, contraception, abortion, stem cell research, etc.). Yet, the Religious Right and
evangelicals in FBOs will remain quiet on mixed fabrics, eating pork, and divorce while
preaching Hell and damnation concerning abortion, Islam, and “deviant” sexuality.
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Essentially, this means that values education is often dictated by those delivering services
and resources to discern whichever values they want to pass along.
The National Association of Evangelicals prides themselves on discerning “Christian
Values” for their partners and members. The NAE even advertises itself as “the premier
organization for articulating an evangelical position on issues that affect our culture”
(“National Association of Evangelicals: Endorsements,” 2018). Chad Hayward, the
Executive Director of the Accord Network which is a self-described “Christ-centered
Relief and Development” networking agency and one of the NEA’s 45,000 partners,
describes this process:
By educating its sizable constituency, the National Association of
Evangelicals promotes understanding of critical issues and also provides an
unmatched platform for speaking into policy issues of the day. The
influence of the NAE is unmistakable.” (“National Association of
Evangelicals: Endorsements,” 2018)
Recognizing the “unmistakable” and daunting influence that FBOs, and the Religious
Right as represented through the NAE alone, hold when engaging in international aid and
development it is critical to carefully examine the impacts of their work. Cloud’s stresses
critics of ideographs must “question the interests motivating ideographic choices as well
as to assess potential consequences of public adherence to a particular vocabulary of
motives” (1998, p. 389). Though Cloud’s analysis of “family values” focuses on how
African-Americans and the poor were negatively impacted in the United States by the
ideograph of “family values,” her logic coincides and can easily be expanded to the
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influence of “family values” in Uganda. Specifically, as the “public adherence” to
“family values” in Uganda is a remarkable, and terrifying, testament to the
“consequences” of unquestioningly following oppressive ideology.

Adopting American “Family Values” in Africa
Family values, as an ideograph, has been exported to Uganda from colonial times to
this day. This has resulted in a cultural clash between Ugandan “family values” and
American “family values.” Remembering McGee tells us that ideographs are empty
vessels in which meaning can be inserted, ideographs act as a vessel for ideology and
cultural ideology. This played out on a large scale in the difference between traditional
African “family values” and American “family values.” For instance, in Dr. Kaomo’s
book Globalizing the Culture Wars: US Conservatives, African Churches, &
Homophobia Dr. Kaomo explains
“When Americans and Africans refer to “family values,” they are talking
about two different sets of social norms. Across Africa, people understand
family as fundamental to identity. The African understanding of “family”
is summed up in the concept of ubuntu, the idea that people are truly
human only when they affirm the humanity of others.” (2009, p. 8)
The idea of ubuntu, or African “family values,” is most succinctly described by Anglican
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, a 1984 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate from South Africa. Tutu
describes ubuntu as “include[ing] all people regardless of their race, sociopolitical status,
or sexual orientation. The African theological outlook . . . affirms the interconnectedness
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and sacred worth of all beings” (Kaoma, 2009, p. 8). Therefore, when blatantly
homophobic and discriminatory policies are passed allegedly founded on “family values”
or in the name of preserving African identity we know this foreign invasion is in fact the
antithesis of ubuntu.
Additionally, the influence of ideographs in Ugandan society is evident in Ugandans’
adoption of specific phrases surrounding the ideograph of “family values.” Swidler
(2010), Bradley (2008), and Probasco (2014) document that it is common in for
“residents of regions targeted for development [to] quickly adopt and adapt the
buzzwords, discourses, and structures of international nongovernmental organizations.”
Though it is common for recipients of development aid and outreach to parrot back
ideologies or buzzwords it can still be surprising especially as this rhetoric directly
contradicts with cultural and traditional practices and beliefs. For instance, a survey from
the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life in 2006 found “a large majority of people in
the Global South hold conservative views on sexuality. For example, 98 percent of
Nigerians and 99 percent of Kenyans disapprove of homosexuality” (Kaomo, 2009, p.
13). More explicitly, Africans living in nations like Uganda, Nigeria, Kenya, and Rwanda
will cite wanting to uphold and protect “family values” as being the reason for their
disapproval of homosexuality.
The power of the ideograph therefore is its alleged harmless appearance that masks
its true insidious nature. While initially, “family values” or “values education” sounds
benign, those who are being conditioned into understanding these seemingly lackluster
words and phrases are “historically and culturally grounded commonplace rhetorical
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terms that sum up and invoke identification with key social commitments” (Cloud 288).
Cloud illustrates that these social commitments manifested in Clinton’s welfare laws in
the 1990s to simultaneously highlight an ideal of a mythic family narrative while
deaminizing those who fell outside those norms (e.g. demonizing families “headed by
single parents, racial minorities, and the poor” (Cloud, 411)). In particular, Cloud argues
that this method of idolizing the perfect nuclear family is because “[t]he mythic family is
a persuasive fiction in the rhetoric of <family values>... the mythic quality of nostalgia
for an idyllic nuclear family that really never existed as a way of life for the majority of
people” (Cloud, 398). Similarly, the “mythic quality of nostalgia for an idyllic nuclear
family” exists in Africa as well, however, the focus is not used to condemn single parents
or black parents. Rather, the nuclear family is used to fortify the idea of marriage as
exclusively being a union between a man and a woman, a mother and father as a homage
to the traditional “idyllic nuclear family.”
Take for example, Kristen Cheney who claims that,
[T]he invention of “the traditional family” [occurs] within a discourse of
postcolonial amnesia (which US evangelical intervention has capitalized
on), remarking that “it is striking how ‘the traditional family’ is invoked in
the bill, when in fact Ugandans have always had very pliable family
arrangements” (p. 86). She claimed that this invention is related not only to
the rise of transnational evangelical homophobia in Uganda but also to the
“overwhelming concern with population and fertility (as indicator of social
stability).” (Cheney, 2012, p. 87; Wahab, 2016, p. 705)
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Since the Regan administration in the 1980s, the Religious Right has used family values
to highlight issues of homosexuality and abortion to unite the right. Now the Religious
Right will use family values as a platform to set a moral agenda that could reinforce
traditional conceptions of the family and protect against this myth from “creeping tide: of
homosexuality, sexual promiscuity, civil unions and same-sex partnerships, pornography,
prostitution, abortion and stem-cell research” (Marsden, 2013, p. 133). Focus on the
Family is one Christian Right group that has taken this to heart. They believe that through
their domestic and international outreach their particular group can witness the Gospel by
“stress[ing] the pre-eminence of evangelism, the permanence of marriage, the value of
children, the sanctity of human life, the importance of social responsibility, and the value
of stereotypical male and female roles” (Marsden, 2013, p. 139).

The Ugandan Anti-Homosexuality Act
In 2009, Member of Parliament David Bahati introduced the Uganda AntiHomosexuality Act. The bill originally stipulated the death penalty to those who violated
the act by engaging in any form of sexual relations between members of the same sex and
severe punishments to those who recognized or promoted homosexuality. It was later
revised to prison sentences and fines to those who violated the act. The bill was signed
into law in 2014 after being signed by Ugandan President Museveni but later that same
year was ruled as invalid by the Constitutional Court of Uganda.
While this bill was ruled invalid, the sentiments that allowed it to pass are still
very real and mob mentality rules in de facto settings adding an additional layer of peril
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to LGBTQ members in Uganda and their allies. For instance, Ugandan gay rights activist
and proud member of the LGBTQ community David Kato was beaten to death in his
hometown of Bukes, Mukono Town due to his sexuality and outspoken views. Other gay
activists have been beheaded by their neighbors. Countless others report constant threat
of death or beatings by their neighbors because of the blatantly homophobic political
climate on both the state level and within their own communities. Even so the protection
for the LGBTQ community is virtually non-existent. Even the Minister of State for Ethics
and Integrity, James Nsaba Buturo, has been quoted as saying “Homosexuals can forget
about human rights” (Gettleman, 2011).
In addition to a complex history between LGBTQ issues and FBOs within subSaharan Africa, evangelicals working through FBOs were clearly the source, inspiration
and influence of the Uganda Anti-Homosexuality Act. In March 2009, infamous antiLGBTQ “activists” American Reverend Scott Lively, Caleb Lee Brundidge, Don
Schmierer and Stephen Langa (founder of Family Life Network Uganda) held seminars
in Kampala to the Ugandan parliament labeled “Seminar on Exposing the Homosexual
Agenda” (Kaomo, 2009, p. 15; Gettleman, 2010). These four as well as Ugandan pastor
Martin Ssempa were largely responsible for framing the national narrative and
“encourage[ing] broad-based action across Ugandan society to condemn homosexuality
for its supposed threat to the family” (Kaomo, 2009, p. 15). These seminars were labeled
as “viciously homophobic” as Lively drew on his previous work, The Pink Swastika, in
which he blames homosexuality for the rise of Nazism in Germany and reveals the
alleged “gay agenda” which he claims targets children worldwide.
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While Lively’s work has been blatantly disproven and his influence in the US
limited, in Uganda, Lively, and others from the Christian Right, are accepted as factual.
Dr. Kaoma writes that “their antigay statements are taken as gospel, not opinion, by many
Africans” (2009). This has led to an increase in the persecution of sexual minorities and
the criminalization of acts that do not fall within the strict (yet oddly selective) confines
of “Christian family values.” Given this elevated platform and access to influence
American conservative from the Religious Right feel “freer to be open about their
homophobia in Africa than in the United States” (Kaomo, 2009, p. 16). For instance,
Pastor Rick Warren has been recorded saying “Homosexuality is not a natural way of life
and thus not a human right... The Church of England is wrong on [homosexuality] and I
support the Church of Uganda” (Kaomo, 2009, p. 15) While Rick warren put on
appearances as a moderate stateside, he espouses extreme and hate-filled views against
the LGBTQ community while in Africa. Sadly, Rick Warren is not the exception to the
rule. Rather he is an embodiment of the new standard our modern political climate has
produced in this “pay to play” system where FBO evangelism has fundamentally
reshaped development outreach in Uganda.
Evangelical Scott Lively not only cited the need to preserve family values in his
sermons and addresses to Ugandan parliament, but he referred to his homophobic
campaign in Uganda as a “pro-family mission to Uganda” (“Report from Uganda,” 2009)
to his congregation (a.k.a. his donors). Lively goes on to claim that “the Ugandan people
are strongly pro-family, and there is a large Christian population which is much more
activist minded than that of most western countries . . .” (2009). While there is a
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difference in the rhetorical sleight of hand that Lively uses (“more activist minded than
that of most western countries” attacking as a feeble mask to describe that Ugandans are
more willing to support homophobic policy than those in the West) Lively does draw on
the ideograph of “family values” in referencing “pro-family” mindsets. This same
ideograph is the same one that has predicated policy change and political rhetoric in the
US as Dr. Cloud cites referencing Clinton’s welfare policies. These ideographs are not
only still employed in the developing world in place like Uganda, but they are perhaps
even more deeply rooted due to the unique nature of development exchanges.
One final component of analysis to consider when discussing ideographs and
constitutive identity. The unique nature of the evangelical mindset adds a component of
moral absolutism to this very dangerous concoction of rhetoric. Dr. John Edwards in his
book Superchurch describes the Fundamentalists’ mindset as follows.
Once a convert, the Fundamentalist believer is secure in his or her rightness,
and this perspectival blindness continues to raise legitimate concerns about
the conflagration of apocalyptic narratives with present-day politics...Just
as apocalyptic events can be read as allegorical figures for present-day
believers, present-day events can be and are read as allegories of
apocalypse, present-day events can be and read as allegories of apocalypse,
and political disagreements are reinterpreted as precursors to violent
suppression that demand uncompromising and militaristic responses from
the faithful against their enemies. (pp. 109-110)
Uganda has been selected as a battlefield for evangelicals to disseminate their version of
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“Christian values” when mainstream America left their ideas behind. In this war, the
rhetoric has been paired with threats of salvation and damnation, and anything but strict
adherence to values can be linked to apocalyptic threats of end times. It is my belief that
this moral absolutism is what conditions evangelicals and African converts to adopt
“uncompromising and militaristic responses.” Additionally, due to the nature of
constitutive rhetoric, the sanctioned action and group thought can be tightly controlled
through weekly rituals like praying with groups, listening to sermons, and any additional
social services offered by evangelical FBOs. Imagine, sitting in a pew being told what
present political situations indicate signs of the end time. Imagine, being told that you
will be literally left behind for anything less than strict adherence or wavering in your
faith. Imagine, being told that you live in a holy war your “enemy” and codes of conduct
are ascribed to you. Under these scenarios, constitutive rhetoric is no longer a complex
theory. Rather, constitutive rhetoric explains one of the most oppressive policy and
collective human rights abuses in modern history.
Linking immorality and the apocalypse to LGBTQ isn’t a one-off theory or
unfounded assertion. One concrete way that American and Ugandan evangelicals have
adopted their rhetoric to link apocalypse and LGBTQ issues is citing progressive LGBTQ
legislation in the U.S as proof of “the gay agenda.” Dr. Kaoma explains this process,
“LGBT Africans suffer a kind of ‘collateral damage’ from the US culture wars, as every
victory in the US increases their suffering from bigotry and violence” (2009, pg. 15).
Scott Lively, would use LGBTQIA victories (such as the passage of anti-discrimination
to protect gender and sexual minorities or the legalization of same-sex marriage) as
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fodder for the narrative of an “encroaching gay conspiracy” resulting in increased bigotry
and violence for the African audiences of fundamentalist American evangelicals.
Uganda has become a battleground for Christian values. However, moderate voices
have been systematically cut out of the dialogue which has led to a rise in fundamentalist
and more extreme beliefs. Ugandan Stephen Langa has been quoted on record saying he
hopes to see “significant improvement in the moral climate of the nation, and a massive
increase in pro-family activism in every social sphere. [Stephen Langa] said that a
respected observer of society in Kampala had told him that our campaign was like a
nuclear bomb against the “gay” agenda in Uganda. I pray that this, and the predictions,
are true.” (Lively, 2009). The irony that Langa, a Christian, and other Christians who
purport “pro-family activism” would ever advocate such violence is egregious and,
frankly, heart breaking.
This culture war is allowed to happen because those in power of governments
typically benefit from the myth that homosexuality is un-African. The myth that to be gay
is un-African is that African leaders benefit from scapegoating the LGBTQ community.
This hateful myth allows corrupt leaders to mask the wrongs of their administration and
governments by diverting attention away from themselves. Therefore, those in positions
of power in African societies allow the myth to continue and even go so far to perpetuate
it. Dr. Kaoma writes,
“Since the late 1990s, the Anglican archbishops of Uganda, Kenya, and
Nigeria, and presidents Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Robert Mugabe of
Zimbabwe, and Sam Neuroma of Namibia have all used homosexuality to
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distract people from the issues facing their countries and churches by
claiming that homosexuals are responsible for moral decay in Africa. They
have linked homosexuality with “child molestation, ritual child murder,
corruption, opposition parties (in Uganda), pornography, and other social
ills” (2009, pg. 15).
This is not to say that FBOs are necessarily responsible for the corruption of
dictators like Mugabe and Museveni. However, it is important to recognize that multiple
individuals have the ability to control and manipulate ideographs to fix their agendas.
FBOs and corrupt leaders in Africa can both contribute to the same ideograph and do so
with wildly different motivations. Cloud explains the need to understand “the dimension
of social control and coercion in understanding the ideograph is crucial” (1998, p. 389)
because those in power will use ideographs as tools to consolidate power leading those
who are oppressed by them to not even question the systems of injustice they find
themselves subject to. This is why FBOs, and those who participate in FBOs with the
best intention of helping others, need to critically examine their actions and what values
they support being taught. Even those from the Global North who participate in short
term service trips to support those in developing countries with value education and
proselytism outreach, leave long lasting consequences to the communities once they
leave.
In addition to stigmatizing homosexuality, pastors and politicians would accuse
opposition or even other pastors of being homosexual to “destroy them” (Farley, 2014,
p.12). Politicians have spun transgressions on LGBTQ to not even be recognized as
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human rights abuses. Prominent politicians, religious leaders, and heads of communities
repeat sentiments like “[T]hey’re worse than animals, they’re worse than dogs” (Farley,
2014, p. 13). These governments want people to focus their attention on nonconforming
sexualities in order to distract the people with “moral issues so they won’t focus on a
corrupt dictator/president” (Farley, 2014, pg. 13). This scapegoating ramps up the anger
against the LGBTQ and ensures that corrupt political leaders are able to stay in office
longer. In exchange these leaders who are so confident in their all-encompassing power
may act violently against citizens, these same groups then express their anger through
projection on the LGBTQ community as political and religious leaders cite the LGBTQ
community as being the root cause of their nation’s problems.
Coopting and rebranding “family values” and “value education” as ideographs are
particularly pernicious because it coopts not only what normal is allowed to be but what
is “moral.” It also sanctions actions of the collective going forward by constraining what
action is permissible (according to those in positions of power). When that state
sanctioned action involves harming and killing others based on who they choose to love
and under the guise of morality, something has gone terribly wrong. McGee articulates
this same conclusion in his 1975 work “In Search of ‘The People’” “the people” even
though made “real” by their own belief and behavior, are still essentially a mass illusion”
(McGee, pg. 242). The illusion that LGBTQ issues are somehow not human rights issues
are predicated on the illusion that homosexuality is not present in Africa. This illusion
though entirely false has become “real” and now results in very real death to countless
LGBTQIA members, women and opposition members across the continent.
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In rewriting the history of LBTQIA presence in Africa, homosexuality has been
categorized as “un-African” and as a form of Western imperialism. Additionally,
attempting to step outside gender norms and pursue non-traditional sexuality
(homosexuality, bisexuality, etc.) have been labeled as detrimental to the sanctity of
“family values.” Specifically, the rhetoric used by evangelical missionaries (FBOs) to
Ugandans have linked homosexuality to “sexual anarchy” with claims that it “weakens
the moral fiber of the people” (God Loves Uganda, 2013). This pervasive myth that
homosexuality “corrupts the young” is indoctrinated through rituals like preachers airing
graphic scenes from gay pornography during church services paired with explicit lies
claiming that homosexuals target children and mischaracterizing sexual encounters
between two willing participants as violent and uncleanly (God Loves Uganda, 2013).
American evangelicals teach their Ugandan counterparts to treat homosexuality like a
disease. For instance, American evangelical Scott Lively advocated to give those who
engage in same sex relations “to give arrestees the choice of therapy instead of
imprisonment, similar to the therapy option I chose after being arrested for drunk
driving” (“Report from Uganda,” 2009). The obvious implication of this statement is to
treat homosexuality like a disease (similar to alcoholism) or as a product of a morally
deficient choice like choosing to drink and drive.
The narrative of family values and that nature of LBTQ issues were rewritten through
multiple tactics that reinforce ritual. US conservatives would use FBOs (a.k.a. Christian
missions) to fund radio broadcasts and control narratives on their airways. By
broadcasting their narratives through sermons, slanted reiterations of the news or political

134

commentary they could directly control the messages that countless Ugandans could
access in rural or urban parts of the nation (Kaoma, 2009, pg. 8). This could be teachings
on homosexuality, apocalyptic sign of the impending end times, or misconstruing other
tolerant or centric FBOs from the US. Dr. Kaomo writes that control of radio waves
“this gives conservatives ongoing opportunities to misrepresent mainline
churches’ views to unsuspecting Africans. They saturate the continent with
distorted images of mainline US denominations, branding them as
imperialistic and opposed to African interests, when in fact mainline
churches have long supported national liberation, social justice, and a
preferential option for the poor. (Kaomo, 2009, p. 8)
In addition to radicalizing how Ugandans viewed more moderate denominations through
FBOs control of constantly funded radio airwaves as well as FBO control of education
systems, there are clear examples of ghostwriting in which Western FBOs blatantly used
African leaders as leaders to broadcast their messages. One tragically clear example is the
documentation of RD altering Kulah’s statement on churches in East Africa. The IRD
published on its website a different reiteration still using Kulah’s name conforming
Kulah’s original statement to the IRD’s positions. Dr. Kaomo reports,
In his original statement, Kulah had complained that: Euro-Western
Churches seem to be deserting the biblical path of Church planting, disciplemaking, of prayer, and evangelistic and missional endeavors to an inward
focus. This inward focus of some Churches has almost changed the biblical
mandate from the “Great Commission” to the “Great Omission.” (2009)
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Conversely, the IRD’s new version of Kulah’s statement read:
“We in Africa are deeply concerned that elements of 3 Euro-Western
Methodism seem to be deserting the traditional path of Church planting,
disciple-making, of prayer, evangelistic and missional endeavors with the
aim of winning souls for Christ to an inward focus. This inward focus of
some of the Church has almost changed its call from the “Great
Commission” to the “Great Omission.” Its inward focus has further altered
its agenda from issues addressing more than two billion people of the world
who have never had the opportunity to hear of the saving grace of Christ
and hence make a decision to accept or reject him to sociopolitical issues
which have the propensity to destroy the very purpose of the Church’s
existence. (Kaoma, 2009)
Scholars like Paulo Freire often mention the harm of speaking for others because it takes
away the voice, and therefore the agency, of an individual. If someone cannot articulate
their own experiences of oppression, then they cannot name what structures need to be.
By not only intervening but directly placing words in the statements of religious leaders,
FBOs from the West gain absolute control in planting the narrative of acceptable “family
values.”
This is deeply problematic because FBOs are stripping agency from the
populations they claim they want to empower. Further, they are sanctioning what is
socially acceptable through the use of prominent African leaders while pulling the puppet
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strings from behind the scenes. By controlling this agenda FBOs ensure the scales of
power will be titled in their favor. Ultimately, this strengthens the conclusion of Jim
Naughton, the author of Following the Money, who believes that “what has long been
portrayed as the authentic voice of African Anglicanism is, manifestly, not African, and
perhaps never has been.” (2005). When FBOs have been actively influencing African
policy, tradition and beliefs for multiple centuries, it is not enough to call for critical
examinations of FBOs in the last decade alone. Rather in order to dismantle stigma we
must address all practices, over the course of centuries, that have lead to the egregious
situation we find ourselves in today.
Therefore, it is unsurprising that over time African religious leaders also began to
parrot the language of their Western counterparts out of necessity and incentive. They
would do so either because they genuinely believed this rhetoric or to cater to implicit
donor demands. In the film God Loves Uganda, Ugandan church leaders were quoted
saying that “Donations from Western churches multiplied by three when we said no to
homosexuality” (God Loves Uganda, 2013). This mirrors the findings from Dr. Tamsin
Bradley who writes on the power relations that inadvertently are at play when FBOs
engage in community work. Bradley writes “Power can be seen in the relationships
between different FBDOs, dividing those that have money and can decide who to give it
to and for what cause, from those FBDOs that are dependent on them for funding. Power
also characterizes the relationships between FBDOs and local communities. (2009,
pg.102). Building upon Bradley’s work it is evident why US conservatives have
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succeeded in not only dominating African Christianity, but in rewriting aspects of
African culture as well.
Providing social services and aid relief seems to be the magic bullet. Kaoma
describes this process in detail:
By . . . simply out organizing mainline churches, for example, by providing scholarships—
which insure that African clergy receive conservative theological training—as well as loans
and other services. They sponsor orphanages, Bible schools, universities, and social
welfare projects. By providing education and small-business opportunities, US
conservatives have convinced Africans that they are the perfect partners (2009, p. 7-8).
Ugandan activist Frank Mugisha testifies to this process by confirming reports that
Ugandans, typically recipients in the development relationship, have begun parroting the
rhetoric of the Christian Right donors.
“Well-funded American evangelical organizations have for over ten years
been relentlessly stoking a disgust and loathing of sexual minorities. . . .
Now we are told that Uganda will not bow to “the gay agenda” – a phrase
I had never heard until a few years ago when American evangelicals
introduced it” (Mugisha, 2014).
There has been a documented change in rhetoric that Ugandans use to mimic their
donors, and play into structures of injustice created by their oppressors. This happens in
explicit ways and is often caused by implicit demands that the unique nature of aid lends
itself to. This once again illustrates why it is critical to examine “the interests motivating
ideographic choices” in order “assess potential consequences of public adherence to a
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particular vocabulary of motives” (Cloud, 1998, p. 389). Further, it is critical for all
stakeholders in this complex relationship to question their contribution in the process.

Conclusion
Beyond a purely rhetorical analysis, state sponsored Family Values in Africa has had
a serious impact on the lives of people. In terms of development money devoted to
fighting the AIDS/HIV endemic/ pandemic, Uganda became a war zone for differing
cultural ideology. African and American “family values.” What is most unique about this
case study is see we see claims by McGee play out on very real levels. For instance,
McGee describes “Each political myth presupposes a “people’ who can legislate reality
with their collective belief. So long as “the people” believe basic myths, there is unity
and collective identity.” (McGee, 1975, p. 244). We have now seen the Ugandan people
follow this mass illusion, buy into a mythic reality, and “legislate reality.”
As shown in the persecution of the LGBTQ community in Uganda, when constitutive
rhetoric controls the political system and the minds of people, mob mentality rules and
corrupts the rationality of democracy. Charland writes that “the significance of
constitutive rhetoric is that it positions the reader towards political, social, and economic
action in the material world and it is in this positioning that its ideological character
becomes significant” (Charland, 1987, pg. 140). Clare Byarugaba reflects on the
terrifying reality of extremist constitutive rhetoric as a gay woman and activist living in
Uganda describing her experiences as “unbearable, because you never know when the
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police are going to knock down your door, or a mob, or if your neighbor is going to beat
you to death.” (Farley, 2014, pg. 13)
Policy also ensures systematic violence against the LQBTQ community, women and
those living outside of the Religious Right’s evangelical “family values.” Policies leading
to actions like government conducted raised of HIV/AIDS clinics in Uganda’s capitol,
Kampala, which arrested clinic employees that cared for men who have sex with other
men (Farley, 2014, p. 14). Backing abstinence only prevention policy for HIV/AIDS
which has not only created stigma around condoms, practicing safe sex, and more pliable
romantic relations, it has ostracized those who fall outside those confines making it even
harder for these marginalized communities to get aid. Needle exchange programs have
also been banned and through executive orders like Trump’s reinstatement of the Mexico
City Policy, abortion and family planning are limited. The Mexico City Policy pulls
funding from organizations offering family planning, and creates a vacuum for more
FBOs to move in (either state sponsored or otherwise). Ugandan gay rights advocates are
murdered in broad daylight as law enforcement officials willingly turn a blind eye. When
we recognize that myths can become reality through legislation, constitutive rhetoric
takes on a frighteningly sharp edge. If you do not hit in the confines of what or who
society tells you to be, then the majority collectively accepts a false logic that you are not
as worthy as they are. You are a threat to their existence and they will write legislation
that won’t protect you, it will justify targeting you.
One thing is clear, Uganda is a cultural battleground for American values. Take
for example Christian evangelical from the FBO Focus on the Family who, in no
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uncertain terms, identified Uganda as “an important target for the ‘gays’ because of its
internationally-renowned victory over AIDS through abstinence campaigns. It went from
having the highest to the lowest disease rates in Africa” (Lively, “Report from Uganda,”
2009). This is blatantly false, Uganda now faces paramount struggles with HIV/AIDS
because of abstinence campaigns and FBO prominence.
As a direct result, this has led to stigmatization and undoubtedly the death of
vulnerable populations within Uganda like the LGBTQ community. Further it
undermines international development efforts as the United Nations has put forward with
the millennial development goals which emphasizes the need for family planning and
ensuring basic human rights for all regardless of their race, gender or sexual orientation.
The US cannot both profess commitment to Millennium Development Goals and
actively undermine them by actively inhibiting family planning overseas. Due to the hand
in hand rise of the Religious Right and liberal approaches to welfare in the United States,
the USFG has outsourced development resources and social services to the lowest bidder.
Due to the extenuating circumstances of FBOs fundraising abilities, FBOs have been able
to occupy a particularly large space in this new sector of private- public partnerships. In
occupying this space, FBOs have fallen back to the same practices of indoctrination
(proselytism, evangelizing, witnessing, etc.) that have been employed by colonial powers
since the 1800s in sub-Saharan Africa. The desire of FBOs to both reach out to the most
vulnerable and to create new converts have resulted in a neo-colonialist crusade in Africa
and across the Global South.
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FBOs as Neo-Colonizers
In the same way that the British used FBOs to indoctrinate Christian values and
write over histories as a tactic to colonize Uganda, the American Religious Right has
used FBOs to export cultural wars to Uganda since the 1980s through the guise of
“family values.” FBOs use development outreach, like offering aid or social services, as a
platform to disseminate this form of indoctrination through the guise of altruism. FBOs
development outreach also spans further than most as these groups are willing to go
where no other state or NGO would go. What’s more, they profess to protect the family
while actively undermining true African family values and destroying families in the
process. Take the heartfelt testimony of Frank Mugisha,
“I am a gay man. I am also Ugandan. There is nothing un-African about me.
Uganda is where I was born, grew up, and call my home. It is also a country
in which I have become little more than an unapprehend criminal because
of who I am. I want my fellow Ugandans to understand that homosexuality
is not a Western import. It is instead the current wave of homophobia that’s
been imported from the ‘developed’ world.” (2014)
In the simplest terms, the waves of homophobia created in part by FBOs and
evangelicals are hurting people. Activists, gay individuals, and allies in Uganda receive
death threats from their neighbors and their government. Others still are imprisoned and
murdered because of who they choose to love and refusing to conform to a narrative
meant to oppress them. It is baffling that one of the most immoral acts in the history of
mankind, murder, is justified on the premise of a false Christian morality. At times,
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words fail me trying to articulate the evil that has come as a byproduct of those trying to
intervene with good intentions. Even worse, those same individuals refuse to
acknowledge their part in this creation and opt into a selective silence on the issues of
immorality they have created.

FBOs as an Ideograph
Over the span of the last 20 years, Christian faith-based organizations in Africa have
used the pretense of international aid and development to receive and deliver social
service funding from their congregations and the US Federal Government. In addition to
constituting identity of communities they interact with by engaging in coercive practices,
FBO as a term has in effect become an ideograph in itself. In many ways, evangelical
FBOs are recognized in political spheres as being synonymous with anti-abortion and, for
many, as agencies against LGBTQ communities and rights. This recognition has been
verbalized by our current President through his executive order reinstating the Mexico
City Policy. Individuals from African nations who saw funds cut off to NGOs after the
reinstatement of the Mexico City Policy saw a rise in FBO aid. One individual voiced
their frustration that fundamentalist American values are being imported under the guise
of aid. Specifically, FBO outreach in Africa has “nothing to do with gospels but
American culture wars as their influence continues to spread” (God Loves Uganda,
2013). Recognizing that those abroad and at home are beginning to understand the
practices and true objectives of FBOs it is time to hold FBOs accountable for their
actions.
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Through the case study of Uganda and the American Religious Right exporting
“family values” we can understand why ideographs can never be merely neutral vessels
but rather ideographs can be oppressive and manipulative tools used to constrain the
identities of vulnerable groups in society (Cloud, 1998). Further, proselytism (regardless
of what ideograph it is disguised as) and FBOs can be extremely dangerous because they
are using colonizing practices in order to impose Western values. As Marsden writes,
“the deliverer of humanitarian assistance by conservative organizations determined to
convert patients, the hungry and the destitute to Christianity as their first priority will be
seen as religious imperialism, to be added to the economic and cultural imperialism that
causes so much consternation in the global South.” 2008, p. 251
Ultimately, I believe that by using international aid and development in order to
get access to vulnerable populations FBOs are engaging in neo-colonial practices. In
addition to being ethically dubious, the very principles FBOs are founded by are undercut
through coercive, proselytizing practices. These principles occur from three perspectives:
the state, the faith, and on a level of human dignity.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion
William Shakespeare once wrote, would a rose under any other name smell as
sweet? I would posit, does an FBO engaging in proselytizing practices reek any less of
colonialism just because it is done in the name of God? The importance in understanding
ideographs is underwritten in this logic. Ideographs, much like colonization, have tactics
associated with them in order to manipulate and control populations. Putting these two
ideas into conversation with one another shows the inexplicable evil that can happen
when good intentions perpetuate insidious structures.
The director of the award-winning film God Loves Uganda was quoted as saying,
“If any change is going to happen, it’s going to happen in the faith community, which I’m
hoping will stand up and say, ‘This is not what Jesus would want’” (Williams, 2014, p.
15). I hope that through this paper those who find themselves either in (or out) of the faith
community can both see that FBOs need to be critically examined for the sake of the
people they aim to help and for the overall integrity of the church.
Through analyzing multiple case studies, this document has proven that
organizations that ascribe to strong faith tenants and good intentions yet lack critical
introspection can lead to disastrous consequences for the populations FBOs aim to help.
Specifically, I have shown how ideographs have been coopted and weaponized, the way
that collectives can legislate their values into reality, and how painful this can be for
those who fall outside of the socially accepted narrative like we saw in Uganda.
Recognizing the limitations of this work, I would have liked to have had more
time to devote to an in-depth study of the individual ideographs I have found through my
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research (e.g. holistic development, stewardship, FBO, the Religious Right, evangelizing,
etc.). Due to the time constraints provided by this project, I did not have enough time to
perform dychronic analysis in addition to the synchronic analysis I explicated above for
ideographs like “development” and “body of Christ.” The ability to trace these
ideographs through decades or even centuries of evolution would unearth critical insight
into how the narrative has been molded depending on which groups held power at the
time. Uniquely, tracing back “the body of Christ” before it became such a large ideograph
in evangelical traditions might dig up connections to the Catholic church, a tradition
evangelicals attempt to separate themselves from. Similarly, it would be interesting to see
how “development” is viewed from perspectives outside of the neoliberal lens of the
United States and the Western views of the human rights tradition. Or even how
“development” may differ as an ideograph for FBOs of non-Christian backgrounds.
Additionally, I would have liked to either expand my sample pool beyond
Compassion International, World Vision, and the National Association of Evangelicals or
to dive deeper into their evolutions. I would ideally like to trace the history and rhetoric
these organizations used over the span of the last five decades to see they have evolved to
keep with the ever-evolving political climate and the rise of international development
and aid.
Moving forward, I see myself continuing this research for years to come. This
thesis has only begun to scratch the surface of this cross section of issues. There are so
many potential crossroads to delve into with these topics, I want to continue examining
the rhetoric used by religious organizations with a special emphasis on the rhetoric
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employed by the Christian Right. The myths that these groups have created are
phenomenal in constituting identity by trans-historically reassigning divine intervention
throughout modern history. I believe that the case studies I provided about FBO
intervention in Uganda and South Sudan are mere microcosms, or symptoms if you will,
of a much larger “divinely” inspired narrative. This narrative needs to be examined in
order to unearth the rationale of these large collectives. Through understanding this
rationale, political scientists can better evaluate how the Religious Right may behave in
voting blocks, larger communities, etc.
I also hope to continue researching rhetoric used by non-profits and development
agencies in the hopes of one day being able to conduct on-the-ground research in order to
assess the impact of these groups on communities once FBOs leave. Currently, one of the
largest problems with development work, and specifically FBOs, are lack of follow-up
assessment to gage how communities are impacted immediately post-departure of the
foreign service provider or years down the line. Further, very few people investigate how
the rhetoric used in the donor/recipient relationship impacts both stakeholders in the long
term. In particular, how recipient communities are impacted by the rhetoric of the FBO
long after the organization leaves. My dream is to conduct interviews with individuals
who have gone through sponsorship programs with Compassion Child or World Vision
or to follow up with individuals who converted to Christianity while receiving
conditional aid from organizations like Samaritan’s Purse.
Ultimately, the best way to fine-tune development practices involve demanding
more accountability from service providers in both short-term and long-term outcomes.
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The only way to accomplish this is to return to communities after NGOs, FBOs, or statesponsored aid have left in order to document what remnants of this interaction exist five,
ten, or even twenty years down the line.
Another constraint for this project is that I was not able to find the testimony of
many aid recipients. In order to understand how their identity is constituted on an
intrapersonal and internalized level, direct quotes from individuals receiving aid in
developing countries would need to be analyzed just as closely as FBOs published
materials. Sadly, those testimonials are difficult to find online. Rather, the narrative that
FBOs put out to potential donors and partners is carefully constructed to be what the FBO
wants to project to the world. Due to the unique nature of FBOs’ target audience being
“the least of these” (loosely meaning the poorest of the poor living in the Global South)
these individuals do not have the same platforms to share their narratives as resource rich
FBOs.
Conversely, a more robust project would have focused on FBOs with other faith
foundations like Muslim, Buddhist, or Hindu FBOs. The way that faith influences each
can greatly alter the goals they pursue when engaging in development and aid work as
well as the methods they are willing to use. Due to the evangelical nature of the Religious
Right, the implicit overarching goal of evangelical FBOs tend to be conversions.
Hinduism, which is one of the only religions not to require conversion, might have very
separate end goals and therefore may use different, less coercive practices. Which then
begs the question, would some faiths be better suited for development work than others?
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Finally, I could have limited my analysis to focus on one organization’s work in
order to narrow the scope and dive deeper into the relationships developed through one
singular case study. The Church of Latter Day Saints, for instance, sends thousands of
individuals, typically young men and women, to spread their faith and aid in community
development through two year-long missions. Had I fine-tuned my focus to this group
alone I believe I would have found further evidence of identity formation as a result of
the rhetoric being used when LDS missionaries “witness” to some of the world’s most
vulnerable populations. Further, this group could uniquely lend a metric for analysis on
long term community impact since LDS missions tend to stay in communities longer than
disaster relief FBOs or short-term volunteer trips more common with Christian FBOs.
Additionally, due to the well-organized nature of the LDS church, their English language
schools, volunteer services, and start up projects have a higher likelihood of being
maintained after individual missionaries are phased out since the administration will
replace them with new missionaries. This ensures LDS projects are maintained long after
individual missionaries are phased out, solidifying their presence as a staple of the
community and offering a somewhat more sustainable model.
Going forward I expect to see similar patterns turn up in expanded research.
Ideographs exist in both the worlds of development and faith communities so when the
two spheres begin to mesh, these ideographs can become coopted and more complex. As
I have illustrated through my analysis, this combination can result in tangible policy
impacts as well as metaphysical distress to individuals based on their identity formation.
This is why it is critical to understand coercion can occur as an unintended side effect of
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this ideological exchange when groups tie this interaction to resources necessary for aid
relief or much-needed social services.
In the same way that some claim spreading human rights ideology carries
undertones of Western liberal ideals, FBOs spreading religious ideology also
inadvertently transmit cultural values. In this instance, when evangelicals spread religious
ideology they also spread the values they believe in which we would identify as the
cultural values and norms of fundamentalist-right wing individuals. Their views on issues
like family planning and sexuality seep into their teachings because their ideology is
intrinsically linked to their cultural views and practices. As a result, FBOs can
unintentionally create collective identities despite having the best intentions not to
proselytize or be coercive. This is not necessarily malicious, rather it occurs because
human interaction requires individuals to use communication to articulate meaning in the
world when engaging with others. This communication unchecked or complicated by
language barriers can muddy expectations of both parties in the donor/recipient
relationship.
Evangelicals cherish their ideology because it allows them to create meaning,
when they communicate this ideology to one another they use ideographs to bond
together and to share that meaning making. This shared identity drives the collective to
venture out into the world to share their passion, their ideology. Since these ideographs
convey meaning, the groups will use them to communicate to one another, to others in
the congregations (like potential donors), and to those they interact with on the ground. If
those on the ground choose to adopt this ideology as their own, they become conditioned
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to these language terms as well. Yet, even those who do not choose to take on this
ideology will still find themselves engaging with the rhetoric of FBOs. Studies show that
recipients will cater themselves to the requests of donors in order to receive their
resources. This forces engagement on the part of the community regardless of whether or
not they accept the ideology because as recipients they will adapt their language to the
donors, or engage in the mythic reality that these groups exist in, to continue receiving
aid.

Prescription
Greater accountability is needed to monitor whether government funded FBOs
proselytize overseas and if they do, then repercussions need to be taken. We cannot both
be a nation that claims to revere the separation between church and state, yet turn a blind
eye to politicians who siphon off government funds to cater to the Religious Right voting
bloc through funding their evangelizing overseas. Stop funding FBOs who cannot uphold
basic standards tied to grant money and require government entities to hold groups who
receive funding more accountable by measuring outcomes in how government money is
being spent. This proposal will not end funding to FBOs entirely but it will ensure that
the ones the United States Federal Government does fund are held to higher standards.
This in return builds the United States’ soft power approach to international aid and casts
our presence in a more positive light.
Greater scrutiny needs to come from within the evangelical community about how
fellow members engage in mission work. Due to the creation of a “pay to play” system in
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international development, it is up to FBOs to hold one another accountable. The
incentive for FBOs holding one another accountable is to keep the integrity of their
message. Do not let the good news of the gospel be tainted by damning practices that
jeopardize the dignity of the most vulnerable populations around the globe. Additionally,
the pressure cannot only come from one church or institution to the next: the pressure
also needs to come back from those sitting in the pews on Sunday morning. This requires
active Christians to question narratives of a radicalized church or methods of
“witnessing” that seem coercive. Jesus tells evangelicals that their responsibility is to
plant the seed of faith and that God will do the rest. By treating individuals with the
utmost dignity and not forcing ideology, evangelicals can uphold Jesus’s teachings and
bring glory to his most beloved creation: mankind.
Finally, NGOs and state sanctioned social service providers need to employ
critical analysis of the rhetoric they use as well as their religious counterparts. At best to
ensure they do not use coercive practices and at worst to note the stigma that FBOs have
created in order to dismantle them. For example, we cannot combat the HIV/AIDS
epidemic in Africa if we do nothing to dismantle the stigma of condoms that has been
created by decades of carefully constructed myths and transmissions of alleged “family
values.” In order to deliver holistic development solutions for individuals living in abject
poverty, individual identities and ideologies must be considered. Human beings are
complex, our identities are created as result of the language we use to articulate our view
of ourselves and our place in the world. As globalization increases, the world becomes
increasingly smaller. We take on language and ideas from other people and cultures we
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interact with. That being said, it would be a fatal mistake to forget the complex identities
of those communities in the Global South who receive services and resources from a
myriad of actors. By examining the rhetoric that these groups have learned and been
formed by through their interactions with a plethora of actors, NGO and governments can
find solutions that will either undo harmful narratives created by the West, and co-create
solutions that will stick due to cultural relevance. If we continue to ignore the impacts of
rhetoric on identity, all we will accomplish is pouring billions of dollars into tokenizing
gestures of false generosity where we claim to “free” communities from poverty while
trapping them in cycles of dependency on Western aid.
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